
Gass JfL ^ 5" / 
Book_U-li_ 



PERPETUAL WAR, 

THE POLICY OF MR. MADISON. 



BEING A CANDID EXAMINATION OF HIS LATE MESSAGE T9 CON- 
GRESS, SO FAR AS RESPECTS THE FOLLOWING TOPieKSM..VIZ. 

THE PRETENDED NEGOTIATIONS FOR PEACE THE IMPOR- 
TANT AND INTERESTING SUBJECT OF A 

CONSCRIPT MILITIA.... 



THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN IMMENSE STANDING ARMY OF 
GUARDS AND SPIES, UNDER THE NAME OF 

A LOCAL VOLUNTEER FORCE. 



•' Tii7n *' Jacobus MddisoV. secundum Prcesfi^" ....gravior remediis quam de- 
dcta erant, suarumque legum uuctor idem, ac subversor qua arms tuebatur^ 
nrmis amisit." taciti ANNALIUM lib. ill. 

LIBERALLY TRANSLATED 

" Then James Madison, a second time President, adopted a remedy for the 
-wrongs of our seamen, infinitely more injurious to them than the evils which 

they suffered he ordered out the militia, in contempt of that very Constitution 

of which he was one of the principal framers. In short, whatever he attempted 
to \inilicate by arms, by arms he lost." 



BY A NEW-ENGLAND FARMER. 

AOTIIOR or \ T.\TE PAMPHLET, ENTITLED, " MR, MADISO^'s WAR. 



BOSTON : 

Printed by C/iestev Stebbiu.i. 

1812. 



INTRODUCTORY REMARKS, 

TO THE PEOPLE OP NEW-ENGLAND, NEW-YORK, 
NEW-JERSEY, AND DELAWARE. 

HOWEVER mucli to be regretted by every 
friend to commerce^ and civil liberty, must be the re- 
election of Mr. Madison, still it is a most cheering 
and consolatory reflection, that the struggle has man- 
ifested an energy, an intelligence, a spirit of concord 
and union, a magnanimous disposition to sacrifice 
party feelings, and personal considerations, in the cit- 
izens of the commercial states, which is unexampled 
in the history of this country. It was indeed to be 
tisared, that no pressure, however great, no sufferings, 
however severe, would detacli men from those chains 
of party with which they bad been so long bound. 
But wc are most happily undeceived ; a sense of 
common danger, a conviction of common interest, and 
of the absolute necessity of union for relief from op- 
pression, snapped asunder the bonds of faction. — 
Mutual condescension, mutual consultation soon ob- 
literated the memory of past distinctions, (which after 
all were merely nominal,) and we now find, witli 
the exception of the dependents upon government, and 
those under their influence, but one great and united 
people, from Maine to Delaware. 

It ought indeed to be so; for, from Maine to Dela- 
\Anve -^vo ]i^vo one common interest, and that is. th^ 



4 

preservation of Commerce, which from Delaware 
southwards, they are determined to destroy. Still 
men do not always perceive their interest. But in 
this case, they could not shut their eyes ; it was like 
^^ Heaven's own lightning,*' it flashed conviction upon 
those who were stone blind. 

Five years successive commercial restriction, was 
found ineffectual ; it made us grow leaner to be sure, 
but we were strong and able to survive it. Our per- 
secutors had not patience to endure our lingering 
death ; they therefore got up the guillotine of a mari- 
time war, to cut off our heads at a stroke. 

This last act of desperation, has accomplished our 
"wishes ; it has opened the eyes of the people, and 
notwithstanding the reelection of Mr. Madison, not 
in vain. If we are as firm and resolute in the pursuit 
of our purposes, as moderate and conciliatory as we 
have hitherto been ; if we continue to sacrifice to the 
attainment of peace and prosperity, our party pas- 
sions, we are certain of success. Let our political 
enemies triumph in their partial victory; let them 
attempt to undervalue our courage, our opinions and 
our importance ; we shall shew them in the next 
Congress, that no government can wage an unneces- 
sary war against the sentiments and interests of the 
people. 

We predicted this change, as did many others, six 
months ago, in the pamphlet, entitled " Madison's 
War." We advised the people to despise the anti- 
republican, despotick opinion, that tlie citizens have 
no right to discuss the merits of a war, after it is de- 
clared. We recommended a constitutional resistance^ 
a resistance at the polls. The people have done so : 
and what is the glorious and unexampled result ? 



Never since the Declaration of Independence, has 
such an union been witnessed. In the lower House 
of Congress, which alone could have been eiFected in 
so short a time by popular elections, we shall proba- 
bly have a peace majority. 

The present prospect is, that not one member of 
Congress, from Maine to Delaware, will be in favour 
of the war. 

In Massachusetts, at no period of its history, has 
it ever enjoyed so united a delegation. Its voice will 
now have, as it ought to, its due weight. Let us ex- 
amine this respectable power, which has risen up as 
it were by magick, or by the finger of Heaven, against 
a daring and headstrong administration. 

These northern and middle states, who are now 
united in opinion, possess 3,000,000 of inhabitants^ 
considerably more than did the wliole United States 
at the time of the Declaration of Independence. — 
They are a body of freemen, distinguished for their 
industry and virtue. They are the owners of nearly 
two third parts of all the tonnage of the United States, 
and furnishes, probably three fourtlis of all the native 
seamen. They are totally opposed to a w^ar for the 
privilege of protecting British seamen against their 
own sovereign. They know, from their own experi- 
ence, that this subject of impressment is a mere in- 
strument, wielded by men who are utterly indift'erent 
about the sufferings of the sailors or the merchants. 

The display of the true principles, upon Avhich this 
subject ought to be considered, is the main object of 
the following Essays. 

We are aware that the friends of administration, 
(and some few who mvj^hi to know better tlie rights 



6 

and tkities of a citizen,) with uncommon pretensions 
to patriotism, iiavc l>ridled themselves in with a 
haughty and censorious air, when they have read 
these essays, and have thought to condemn them, and 
to render the autlior odious, hy representing him as 
supporting the claims of Great-Britain, and as aban- 
doning the rights of America. 

It is a vulgar clamour, which the author heeds not, 
he has no popularity to seek, and he fears not for tlie 
reputation of liis integrity, ^vith the wise and good ; 
hut as sucli a clamour may lead feeble minds to read 
with distrust, and to weigh with uneven scales, it may 
not be amiss to say a word or two upon this subject. 

Is morality, when applied to questions between 
nations, of a dillerent character, and founded on dif- 
ferent principles from what it is, a\ hen applied to in- 
dividuals ? 

Is man an infallible being? or, if he errs, is he 
never to turn from tlic error of his way ? is he never 
to examine the rectitude of his o^^ n principles ? or, if 
convinced of his error, is he never to confess it, and 
alter his conduct ; but must liis pride prompt him to 
persevere in wrong doing ? If, moreover, lie becomes 
satisfied that liis interest as well as his duty require 
a change of conduct, must he still adhere to liis 
errors ? 

Can not a nation do wrong ? do we not contend 
that Britain has often done so ? and is it impossible 
that America should sometimes partake of human in- 
firmities ? 

And if a nation does wrong, must its citizens defend 
even its errors ? Must they spill their blood, and ex- 
haust their treasure, and lose their liberties, rather 



tliau expose the national faults ? But if the doctriae 
be true^ that you cannot discuss such a question freely 
and sliew the mistakes or the misconduct of your own 
country, tlie people will go on blindfolded, and will 
contend with lionest, but mistaken zeal, for principles 
which if tliey had fully understood, tliey would have 
shuddered at supporting. 

I lia\ e now given to my adversaries the most favour- 
able side of the argument for them. But the question 
is not whether our country is in tlie wrong, but 
whether a few men in jiower and place, men whose 
power thrives by wai*, whose salaries are unaifected 
by it, cannot be in the wrong ? The country is oppo- 
sed to the war, for the question of impressment. The 
country knows that it is a question grossly exaggera- 
ted, not worthy of sucli sacrifices. The country does 
not wish to protect Britisli seamen, nor to deprive 
Great Britain of her natural defence. 

But my last, and most complete justiiication is, that 
in my opinion, it would be against our interest, as a 
nation, and against the interest of the seamen espe- 
cially, to gain the question in dispute. The moment 
our fljig shall be a complete asylum to British seamen, 
under which they will be free from all searcli, 
100,000 of them would find the way to our ports, re- 
duce the wages of our native seamen, or send them 
about our streets to beg. It would be, in my opinion, 
the most destructive policy which could be adopted. 
I will then ask, wliether a man may not patriotic- 
ally oppose a pretension of his OAvn country, v. hicli he 
thinks will be essentially injurious to it ? 

1 shall conclude, by quoting the words of an emi- 
nent politician, wlio wrote a century ago. ^^ If 



ilierefore, said he, in future times, it shall be visible? 
that some men, to build up their own fortunes, are 
pushing at their country's ruin, good patriots must 
then exert all tlieir virtue, they must reassume the 
courage of their ancestors ; but chiefly they must sa- 
crifice to tlie publick, all their ancient animosities ; 
they must forgive one another ; it must no more be re- 
membered of what partij any man was ; it being suffi- 
cient to enquire whether he always acted honestly. 
At such a time, the best men of both sides, if the name 
of jiartij still remains, must sliake hands together, 
with a resolution to withstand the subtle and diligent 
enemies of the peace and prosperity of the country. 
In such a juncture, not only the best men of all parties 
must be taken in, but Ave must be angry with no sort 
of men, who will unite against the common enemies 
of our commerce and peace." 

Duver.:int's Essay on (!ie Duty of Private Men, kc. 



MR. MADISON'S MESSAGE. 

NO. 1. 
FOREIGX AND CIVIL WAR RESOLVED UPON '. 

Before we can have the requisite time, and leisure 
to express, and display the profound and awful im- 
pressions, which have been made upon us by this 
unparalleled document — Before we shall be able to 
strip this message of that almost impenetrable cloud, 
with whieJi the present Chief Magistrate knows how 
to envelope.the most alarming designs, and projects — 
Before we display, that cold, relentless, inflexible, 
and audacious spirit, which seems to consider the 
suiferings and distresses of a whole people as mere 
political pastime — which regards the loss of armies, 
and the destruction of thousands of our fellow men 
as trifling incidents in the game, whicli it has pleased 
certain sportsmen to play, I tliink it may be well to 
give to the publick in a concise form, more intel- 
ligible than tlie message was designed to be, the 
leading principles, positions, and opinions, which it 
iias pleased Mr Madison to advance. 

I am well aware, that many good, w ell meaning 
men in reading this message will be carried away at 
flrst with tlie amicable, generous and noble profes- 
sions of its author — It is precisely the art of appear- 
ing to be w hat one is not — of assuming virtues and 
principles which are foreign to our character — of hid- 
ing and sedulously and artfully concealing our de- 
signs, which constitutes that dangerous talent that 
has rendered so many men the scourges of the coun- 
h-y in which they were born — It is only by stripping 

91 



10 

them of tliis disguise, by comparing carefully their 
conduct with their professions, that we can ascertain 
tlie real merit or demerit of men — we mean to at- 
tempt this difficult task, though conscious of our want 
of many of the qualifications necessary to its full and 
able execution. 

The first and most important idea which the Mes- 
sage presents, and which runs through, and forms a 
distinguishing feature in it, is that the WAR, how- 
ever disastrous — however burdensome, however fruit- 
less, however hopeless and desperate, is to be not 
only persevered in, but more expensively, and more 
ferociously carried on. 

Every paragraph is so expressed — every thought 
is so modelled — every fact is so coloured, presented 
or moulded, as to bring the mind to the necessity of 
waging this unnecessary and ruinous war, for aught 
we see, ad infinitum. 

No art which could have a tendency to inflame 
the passions — No motive, which could excite the 
pride, the cupidity or the vengeance of men has been 
overlooked or left unurged. 

We are then in the first place to consider this Mes- 
sage as an unequivocal, and bold declaration that this 
war, notwithstanding the submission of Great Britain 
and her repeal of her orders in Council, must and 
shall be continued with increased expense, probably 
increased disasters, and with the certainty of ultimate 
failure. — We shall in future essays shew that tliese 
dreadful consequences must follow — that the expenses 
will be increased tenfold — the disasters will l)e mul- 
tiplied witliout end — and that the termination must 
be, and will be against us. 

The second proposition which the Message pre- 
sents to us, is, that the ultimatum, the sine qua non of 
a peace is already chans;ed — It is expressly admitted 
by the President that the Orders in Council are re- 
pealed andrepealedin such a manner as '^ to lie capable 
of explanations meeting the views of this Government. ' 



11 

But that the pomt now unsettled, andforwhieli alone 
the war is carried on, is the refusal of the British Gov- 
ernment to suspend the practice of impressment — 
This then is avowed to be the sole cause of prossecu- 
ting the war — There is an end to the restraints 
upon our commerce, but we are to wage this war for 
tlie exemption of British seamen from impressment. 

It is very fortunate for the desired and very desir- 
able unanimity among the people, which is rapidly 
taking place, that we should know from so high au- 
thority, that the cause, for which we are enduring 
such privations, and expending so much blood and 
treasure, is the protection ofrenegadoes and deserters 
from the British navy — we are fighting not for an 
American, but a British interest. 

The third great feature of the Message, is, that the 
Governors of the two old and venerable states of 
Massachusetts and Connecticut are declared to be 
somewhat in a state of insurrection — They are (as it 
were) recommended to be put under the ban of the 
Empire. 

If the war Congress, the high mettled racers of the 
South should be as warmly impressed, as the Mes- 
sage seems to intend they shall be, we must expect to 
see it followed by, a declaration that Massacluisetts 
and Connecticut are in rebellion — by a suspension of 
the lia])eas corpus, and by commissions to Gen. King 
and the volunteers whom Jie has raised, to coerce the 
the refractory states. 

The least we can expect from this part of the Mes- 
sage is a law placing tlie militia under the orders and 
laslies of the officers of the standing army — and our 
papers will soon give us anotlier affecting detail of 
the ceremonies with which the deserters from the mi- 
litia are shot. 

We have much to say on this interesting sub- 
ject — this alarming stride to despotism whicli is pro- 
posed ])y introducing the conscription laws of France 
into our country, but it must be the subject of special 



IS 

and separate f onsideration — We now only mean to 
indicate the topicks which the Message presents. 

The fourth subject which the Message furnishes, is 
the increase and encouragement of the standing army 
and militia. 

New bounties — new pay — new encouragement to 
these locusts who are consuming, like their predeces- 
sors in Egypt, every green thing — every fertile plant 
in our late happy and peaceful country — For what 
purpose are they to be raised ? to repel invasion ? 
We are threatened with none ; to conquer Canada? 
For what purpose? to protect British seamen from 
impressment : and will the conquest of Canada ef- 
fect this ? We know it will not ; our path is on the 
ocean ; we complain that it is obstructed ; in order 
to clear it we turn our backs upon the very path 
which we would open, and march in an opposite di- 
rection. Tliis is a curious mode of effecting an ob- 
ject ; but it will be said that the capture of Canada 
will ooerce Great-Britain ; I admit, that if a man 
steals my horse, I may compel him to do me right by 
taking his house or liis farm or any thing necessary 
to him ; but is Canada vecessarjf to Great-Britain ? 
]Sfo : is it as important to her as her oicn seamen ? 
No ; Then she will never give up to our demand of 
protecting her own native subjects, even if v» c take 
Canada. 

But ilfthly and lastly : The Message suggests an- 
other dreadful thought : a thought which brings to 
our minds all the horrors of Baltimore ; It a])pears 
to us, in a covert and yet very perceptible, and very 
obvious manner, to reccommend an extension of con- 
structive treasons. 

The whole history of the Tudors and Stewarts 
cannot exhibit a latitude of expression more suited 
to make every thing a crime, than the President's 
phrase of " corrupt and perfidious intercourse with the 
enemy.*' 

Suppose a bill framed in these words, declaring 



13 

any uiaii guiUy of treason, who sliould be found liold^ 
ing a ^* coiTiipi and perfidious intercourse with the 
enemy."' 

Suppose the habeas corpus suspended, and Gren. 
King ordered to escort any man on whom the Presi- 
dent's, or Dr. Eustis's, or Gen. Dearborn's, or Mr. 
Hill's suspicions might light to Washington, there to be 
tried by a packed jury*, returned at jileasure (that is 
chosen by the Marshal who is the President's ser- 
vant.) What do you think his chance would be ? For 
my part I had ratlier take my chance with the mercy 
of a Presidential mob, than a Presidential jury — All 
i\\^ facts of which a man could be convicted are de- 
tailed in the late law forbidding supplies to the ene- 
my, what then can be intended except to punish upon 
surmises and suspicion ? The liberty of the people is 
in danger. 



XO. II 

It has been the constant boast of our administra- 
tion, in the midst of the most hostile acts, that it is sin- 
cerely desirous of -peace — such professions cost but 
little, and afford the people who suffer, small consola- 
tion amidst the distresses and ruin occasioned by the 
war. 

A very moderate portion of al)ility is requisite in 
framing letters, and despatches, and messages breath- 
ing a pacifick spirit. 

Yet if the whole conduct of these professing gentle- 
men be examined and analyzed, and if it has appear- 
ed, and shall yet appear, that their conduct is in di- 
rect opposition to tlieir declaration, we ought to enter- 
tain but one sentiment in regard to them, and that is, 
that by adding duplicity to injurous projects and ru- 
inous measures, they merit a double portion of our 
resentment and distrust. 

An overwhelming mass of these pacifick profesisons 



14 

flowed ill upon us at the moment wlioii Hits Uiijust ami 
unnecessary War was declared, and a new edition of 
the same hollow and insincere declarations has just 
been pn1)lished, at the very moment, when we are 
carrying^^'re and sword into the peaceful colonies of 
Great Britain — when we are excited by every species 
of exaggeration and misrepresentation to carry on the 
War with ferocity and fury. 

It is pretended by the President, that at tlie very 
moment of his declaration of War, he made new ef- 
forts to obtain peace, and even solicited an armistice 
before an actual appeal to arms had been made. Wc 
shall say nothing upon this new and unheard of proce- 
dure. We shall admit, though we think the conduct 
extraordinary, that if proposals were made to Great- 
Britain, such as even a feeble, a base and degraded 
nation could accept from a hauglity and much more 
powerful foe, that tlie administration deserve credit 
lor. 

But if it shall appear, as it will, that the offers made 
were not only illusory but insulting ; if they were 
such as any nation not ready to pass under the yoke, 
would have rejected ; — if, in short, it must have lieeu 
foreseen that they ^\ ould be rejected by Great-Britain, 
I can only say that the peoj)le ought to view with dis- 
dain this aiiempt to impose upon their understandings. 

It is my design to analyze this whole correspon- 
dence with Great-Britain, and I fear that I shall be 
compelled to sIicav, to t!ie disgrace of our rulers, that 
all this parade of negotiation had only one o))ject in 
view, to enable the President to raalce a shew of a pa- 
cifick disposition — to lull the lears and excite the hopes 
of the people ; — to secure the reelection of the Author 
of this War to the Presidency. 

In executing this task, I must entreat the attention 
of my readers to two circumstances which they must 
keep in mind throughout tlic a\ hole discussion. 

The one is, that in examining the negotiations and 
propositions of our artful cabinet, propositions adroit- 



15 

ly statedj carefully considered, cautiously expressed, 
combining all the talents of the President and his min- 
isters, very considerable time and attention will be re- 
quisite. 

I am persuaded tlmt to the great mass of readers^ 
the subject will bei'miinteresting — the topics are too re- 
iined, the argument too elaborate and complicated for 
general use. 

It is only from those whose means of information, 
and whose power of discrimination qualify them to 
follow a continued train of reasoning, and whose pa- 
triotism and zeal will induce them to undertake it 
that I expect attention. 

It is however a solemn duty in all those, who know 
how often the People have been deceived by the soph- 
isms and false pretensions of the Cabinet, to examine 
this su])ject, and to attend to the essays of any man 
who will devote his time and whatever talents he may 
possess to this arduous duty. 

The second circumstance worthy of consideration is 
this, that it is impossible to discuss and to prove, 
the insincerity of the offers made by our own cabinet 
without huUrectlif justifying the British cabinet in 
rejecting them. Hence it may be expected that the 
old clamour, of supporting the pretensions of our ene- 
my will be revived, and if we were to utter these sen- 
timents in Baltimore we might be exposed to martyr- 
dom and massacre. We simply however present to 
all tender consciences this plain apology. — Whether 
our rulers have sincerely and honestly solicited and 
sought for Peace is an important question. If they 
have, all opposition ought to be icitMraicn, and we 
should unite in their favour. If they have not ; but if 
in place of it, tliey have endeavoured to deceive the 
people by insincere professions of peace, they merit 
our highest censure and indignation. 

I cannot perceive how this question can be in any 
manner discussed without involving in it, either a 
censure or an approbation of the British Government 



16 

in rejecting the overtures. If any man can see a mid- 
dle course let liim take it. 

For ourselves, conscious of as much patriotism as 
Mr. Madison pretends to, and seeing no reason as he 
does for covering up our thoughts in dark, ambiguous, 
unintelligible language, we shall proceed boldly to 
shew that his late extraordinary proposals for an Ar- 
mistice Avere unreasonable, hostile, and calculated to 
produce every thing hut Peace. 

Having already extended the necessary prelimina- 
ry observations to so great a length ; the limits of a 
newspaper essay will only permit us to make these 
important introductory remarks on tlie subject of the 
late extraordinary and unreasonable propositions for 
an Armistice. 

The first is, that it is we believe the first time, in the 
history of nations, that a proposal for an Avmistict 
was made by the party declaring an offensive ivar, be- 
fore he had struck a single blow upon the enemy ; — 
before he had gained or was likely to gain a single 
advantage. If we should put this measure into a 
simple form, we should say, tliat it was in the nature 
of a menace — " There, Sir, you have failed to yield 
to our threats, because you thought we did not dare to 
make War, we now shew you that we have courage, 
therefore yield." Is this a natural and usual mode 
of conciliating an enemy, and of reconciling him to 
terms which he had before rejected ? 

A brave and i)o werfeul nation would have ])referred 
to have slicwn its prowess — to have wrested some- 
thing from its enemy which it could offer, as the e- 
quivalent for concession. 

Tlie second remark which occurs to us, without 
entering at large into the terms proposed, is that we 
offer to (yreat Britain precisely the same terms which 
were offered by Mr. Monroe in 1807. — We offer to 
exclude British seamen from our publick and private 
ships. — On tliose terms, prope^'ly secured, she offered 
to modify iier practice of impressment. This is 



17 

upon record. Mr. Monroe is bound to acknowledge 
this fact for we have it under his own hand. We can- 
not refrain from asking the question, why tliis point, 
if now oflered in sincerity, was not accepted before the 
War? 

If it had been, as the Orders in Council were vol- 
untarily witlidrawn by Great Briluin, no cause of war 
would have remained. We shall shew in our next 
essay why Great-Britain did not accede to tlie terms 
offered by our cabinet. In short we shall shew that 
there was only a feint — a pretence — an appearance 
of acceding to those terms on the part of our cabinet. 

Lastly — It is evident by the apparent offer, (and 
though t shall shew it was only an offer in appear- 
ance, yet it is so far a commitment or admission of our 
cabinet) that we admit tiiat Great-Britain has been 
always right in complaining of the enticement and en- 
listment of her subjects in time of War : — Because 
our cabinet now propose to prohibit by law the enlist- 
ment of British sailors, and surely they would not a- 
^ree to this if by the law of nations, we, as a neutral 
nation, have a right so to enlist or employ them. Our 
cabinet is not made of such stuff as to give up to 
Great-Britain any legitimate rights. They admit 
therefore they have been in the wrong. 



NO. ni. 

! HE PWOPOSITIONS RF.CIPEOCALLY MADE BY THE AMERICAN 
AND BRITISH CABINETS FOR AN ARMIS riCE, AND THE REA- 
SONS ASSIGNED TOR i liElR REJECTION. 

To facilitate the examination of this subject, I pro- 
pose to consider, 

Is]^. What were the specifick propositions respec- 
tively made ? 

2nd. In what manner they were received by the 
different governments including herein the answers 
«(everallv made. 



18 

3d. The reasonableness of these several proposi- 
tions, and replies. 

If we were to decide, as to tlie nature of any prop- 
ositions made for an Armistice, either from the prac- 
tice heretofore adopted by all civilized nations, or 
from the rules of natural justice, equity and decorum, 
we should certainly conclude that the offer ought to 
be perfectly reciprocal ; not claiming for the party who 
proposes it any advantage over the other to whom it 
is proposed ; otherwise a rejection must be expected, 
and we must look to some otlier motive than the avow- 
ed one for the proposition. To expect that an enemy 
in time of war would voluntarily yield any point with- 
out an equivalent must be absurd — There is only 
one exception to this rule, and that is, where the party 
who makes an unequal and unreciprocal demand, 
has gained some great advantage in tlie war, or is in a 
condition so manifestly superior in point of force as to 
give him a right to dictate tlie conditions of an Armis- 
tice — Thus we have seen Bonaparte often insisting, 
as for instance, to the king of Sardinia, after the battle 
at Coni, and to Austria before tlie treaty of Campo 
Formio, on terms which any equal and unsubdued foe 
would have spurned — In all such cases we consider it 
the language of a haughty master to a humble and con- 
quered enemy — We lielievethat the annals of modern 
Europe cannot exliibit a case where ])etween two par- 
ties perfectly equal, and before the chances of war had 
been tried, terms totally devoid of reciprocity have 
been demanded — Much less could any man conceive, 
that the rulers of seven millions of people, not inured 
to war, with six frigates, and ten thousand ill-disci- 
plined, raw and inexiierienced troops, would demand, 
as a condition of a mere suspension of hostilities, the 
rplin((uisl)ment of a right exercised for four centuries 
from an old powerful nation coni])nsing sixteen mill- 
ions of people, with 300,000 regular troops and 400 
ships of war. 

Yet sueJi a case Me undertake to shew has Mr. 



19 

Madi8on for the first time exhibited — The Orders iu 
Council and blockades having been removed as it is 
now confessed to tlie satisfaction of our cal)inet, the 
practice of Great Britain of reclaiming her own native 
seamen, a practice which we sliall shew under our 
third division to have been coeval with the existence 
of her marine, and a practice uniformly adopted by 
all other nations, especially by America and her ally 
France, this ancient practice was the only remaining 
ground of war, and the only source of dispute between 
the two countries. 

Great Britain claims it as a right — we contend 
that it is a wrong done to us. Now Mr. Madison 
asks as a condition of even a suspension of arms, and 
as the very commencement of negotiation, that Great 
Britain shall relinquish the exercise of this which 
she claims as a right — *^ We will not hear you," says 
Mr. Madison, ^"till you give up your claim, and then 
we will treat w ith you about the justice of it, or the 
modes of indemnifying you for giving it up." 

The first question is, did Mr. Madison make this 
monstrous and preposterous claim ? Could he insult 
any nation, however feeble, by such a preliminary 
proposition ? 

One man says, I do not understand the demand in 
this light — another says, Mr. Monroe explained and 
took it back in a subsequent letter, which by the w ay 
was not written till six days before the Message. 

A third gentleman with honest zeal exclaims, it is 
not possible Mr. Madison could have been guilty of 
playing so broad a farce ! 

I shall prove })y unqestionable evidence that such 
a proposition was made, for which no equivalent was 
offered to Great Britain. 

In Mr. Monroe's instructions to Mr. Russell, dated 
June 26th, eight days after the declaration of w ar, he 
authorises and directs him as follows : " If the Orders 
iu Council are repealed and no illegal blockades sub- 
stituted to them, and ardors are given to discontinue 



^0 

the impressment of seamen [mark it reader ! (mil sea- 
men, British or American, naturalized or not] from our 
A'cssels, and to restore tliose aheady impressed, there 
is no reason why hostilities should not immediately 
cease — securing these objects, you are authorized to 
stipulate an armistice." 

Now, no language could be clearer to shew, that 
the actual discontinuance of tlie practice of impress- 
ment must iwecede even an armistice — In other 
words, a question which has been twenty years in dis- 
cussion between the two nations, a question founded 
on several centuries usurpation, if you please so to 
call it, a question in whicli Great-Britain is support- 
ed by the practice of xVmcrica and France, as 1 shall 
most amply prove, this question which she considers 
a vital one for her marine, Grreat-Britain is required 
to give up as a condition of a temporary suspension 
of arms. 

Mr. Hussell our minister understood liis instruc- 
tions in the light in which I do — and uo man can un- 
derstand them otherwise. 

In his letter to Lord Castlereagh of August 24, 
1812, he says ^* that he is authorised to stipulate 
Avith his Britannick Majesty's government an armis- 
tice on condition that the orders in council be repeal- 
ed, and no illegal blockades substituted ; and that or- 
ders be immediatehj given to discontinue the impress- 
ment of jjer sons from American vessels, and to restore 
the citizens of the United States already impressed.*' 

Here Ave lind the discontinuance of the practice of 
impressment a condition precedent to an armistice — 
It is curious also to notice the legal precision of llus- 
sell's terms — They are to require tlie discontinuance 
of impressment of ''^jjcrsons,^* that is, of all or any per- 
sons — but those he requires to be restored are only 
•• American citizens" — We are astonished that they 
had not the effrontery to demand the re-delivery of 
Britisli subjects who liad been impressed — But on re- 
flection it is as well and nearly tjie same, because tlie 



SI 

terms '' American citizens" iricludes British sailors 
naturalized, many of whom obtained naturalization 
in twenty-four hours after they came on shore — This 
topick we shall however examine when we consider 
llie reasonableness of the propositions. 

Lord Castlereagh comprehended Mr. Russell's de- 
mand in the same manner in which Mr. Kussell 
had understood his instructions. 

" I cannot, said his Lordship, refrain on one single 
point from expressing my surprise, namely, that as a 
condition preliminary even to a suspension of hostil- 
ities, the United States have thought fit to demand 
that the British government should desist from its an- 
cient and accustomed practice of impressing British 
seamen from the merchant ships of a foreign state 
simply on the assurance that a law shall hereafter be 
passed, &c. &c.'' 

His Lordship goes on to declare that Great-Britain 
is now ready as she has been heretofore to agree to a- 
uy substitute which may accomplish the saBic end- 
but this w ill come ])articularly under consideration 
when we come to the second proposed division. 

The present design is merely to prove, that our 
government did demand the discontinuance of im- 
pressment as a jireliminary even to any negotiation — 
But some gentlemen have construed a phrase in Mr. 
Monroe- s letter of the a7th of Oct. to Sir J. B. War- 
ren, as denying the intention to demand the relinquish- 
ment of impressment as a preliminary— We linow they 
are mistaken, and that government do not even now 
pretend that they are ready for an Armistice, unless 
the practice of impressment be first relinquished — 
Tlie clause on which tloubts have arisen is this, Mr. 
Monroe in his letter to Sir John B. Warren, says, 
•• Lord Castlereagh in his note to Mr. Russell, seems 
to have supposed, tiiat had tlie British government 
-accepted the propositions made to it, Great-Britain 
would have suspended immediatehj the exercise of 
a right on the mere assurance of this government that 



as 

a law would be afterwards passed to prohibit the ew- 
ployment of British seamen in the service of the U- 
nited States ; and that Great-Britain would have no 
agency in the regulation to give effect to that jjroposi- 
tion.^^ " Such an idea/' he adds, '' was not in the 
contemplation of tliis government, nor is it to be infer- 
red from Mr. RusselPs note ; but lest such an inference 
should be drawn, subsequent instructions Avere given 
to Mr. Russell with a view to obviate every abjection 
of the kind alluded to. These instructions bear date 
S7th July, and were forwarded by the British packet 
Althea." 

Now, what is it that Mr. Monroe means to deny ? 
That the relinquishment of impressment was an abso- 
lute preliminary ? Or tliat it was not expected that 
Great-Britain should have no voice, no agency in the 
terms of the act of Congress which might be passed 
to regulate them ? We say clearly the latter — We 
prove this by the new instructions of July S7tli to 
Mr. Russell, which are given in the documents, and 
which expressly stipulate, that impressment must be 
instantly abandoned as a preliminary to an Armistice. 

It liowever provides that Great-Britain shall be 
consulted as to the terms of the provision restricting 
the employment of British sul>jects. 

This then, and this only is the point which Mr. 
Monroe meant when he said that Lord Castlereagh 
misunderstood the claims of our government — This is 
further proved by the very same letter to Sir John B. 
Warren, which is dated only sixteen days since, in 
which it is added ^^ that a suspension of impressment 
during the Armistice seems to be a necessary conse- 
quence — It cannot be presumed, while the parties are 
negotiating, that the United States would admit the 
right, or acquiesce in the practice of the opposite par- 
ty." This alone settles the ciucstion as to what waK 
demanded, but we shall remove all doubt hereafteiv. 



m 



NO. IV. 
THE SEVERAL PROPOSALS FOR AN ARMISTICE CONSIDERED. 

If any doubts sliould still i-emain on the mind of 
any one, wliether tlie absolute and entire discontinu- 
ance of the practice of reclaiming her oitm seamen out 
of merchant ships on tlie high seas, was demanded 
by Mr. Madison, of Great-Britain, as a condition of 
granting a suspension of arms only, those doubts 
must be entirely removed by the following additional 
facts. 

Mr. Monroe, Avhenhe denies that Lord Castlereagh 
understood Mr. Russell and our Government aright, 
refers to liis explanatory letter of July 27th by the 
British packet Althea, in wliich he says, that the o- 
riginal proposition is fully explained. On examin- 
ing that letter, we find it again asserted, that " the Or- 
ders in Council, illegal Blockades and Impressments, 
were the principal causes of the war, and if they icere 
removed, you might stipulate an Armistice." 

The only differences between this new explanato- 
ry letter and the former one are the following : 

ist. Mr. Russell was authorised, by the last letter, 
not to insist upon a written stipulation to be contain- 
ed in the instrument declaring the Armistice, but he 
was especially directed to procure an " informal un- 
derstanding, so as to admit of no mistake," that im- 
pressments should be instantly discontinued. 

2nd. He was to make the Government of Great- 
Britain distinctly to understand, that all stipulations 
as to the exclusion of British seamen from our ships 
must ultimately depend on Congress, wliose consent 
would be necessary to give validity to the bargain di- 
plomatically agreed upon. 

When we come to the consiiku'atiou of tlie reason- 
ableness of <he several proposals, we shall resume t!iis 



34 

faci, and ask, whether from tlie very acknowledged 
uncertainty of the temper of Congress on this delicate 
subject, it Avould have been expected of Great-Britain 
that she would yield so ancient a claim for the advan- 
tage of a promise which tlie maker of it avowed he 
had no power to fullil, and where the execution of it 
rested upon tlie good v. ill and good faith of such men, 
as Seaver and Cutts — and Bibb and Troup — and 
Grundy and Clay — and Wright and Nelson ? 

Another proof that our Government never contem- 
plated even an Jlvmistice, but upon condition tliat 
Great Britain would get down upon her Ivuees, put on 
the penitential garments, and renounce the error of 
her ways, will be found in a still later letter from Mr. 
Monroe to Mr. Russell, assigning the reasons wliy 
the President rejected the early, and for us, very fa- 
vourable offers of Sir George Prevost and Mr. Foster, 
for an Armistice. 

This letter, dated August. 21 st, states, tiiat, ^' As 
a principal object of the war is to obtain redress a- 
gainst the Britisli practice of Impressment, an agree- 
ment to suspend hostilities, even before the Britisli 
Government is heard from on that subject, might be 
considered a relinquishment of that claim." 

A pretty curious sort of reasoning, and one for aught 
we see which would forever put an end to all Armis- 
tices ! ! For one party or the other might always urge 
that the agreement to the Armistice would be consid- 
«ered a relinquishment of his claims, and therefore, that 
the otliermust, as a preliminary even to discussion, put 
him in possession of what he demands, otherwise he 
could not in honour negotiate. 

But the most conclusive proof, that an Armistice 
would never be agreed to, unless Great Britain would 
yield (not the point of honour onhj) but lier ancient, 
and as she deems most interesting rigbt (and how dear 
it is to her we shall hereafter shew), will be found in 
tlie last clause of Monroe's letter to J. B. Warren, in 
which he says, 



25 

" If there is no objection to an accommodation re- 
lating to Impressment other than the suspension of 
the Brltisli claim to Impressment during the Armis- 
tice, tliere can be none to proceeding, without the 
AUMisTiCE to tlie discussion and arrangement of an 
article on that subject. The great question being sat- 
isfactorily adjusted, the way will be open to an Ar- 
niistice^^^ &c. 

Here then the question is put at rest. — If Great- 
Britain had been mistaken as to our demand of an 
immediate suspension of her practice of taking Brit- 
ish seamen, it was the most simple thing in the world 
to have intimated, after saying as Mr. Monroe does — 
^•li that is the only objection on the' part of Great- 
Britain to the Armistice, proposed by us, why we will 
agree directly to the Armistice, and to an immediate 
negotiation pending the Armistice on the subject of 
Impressment." 

But tlie reverse is Mr. Monroe's alternative — " If 
you will not agree to suspend Impressment as intro- 
ductory to an Armistice, why we will negotiate without 
an Jlrmistice.^^ Which is equivalent to saying, that 
an Armistice will never be granted, until you yield this 
point. 

We shall shew, by and by, that the last offer of 
treating, without an Armistice, is the mere shad- 
ow of a shade — a pure phantasm, which will e- 
lude the grasp, though it is well calculated to de- 
ceive the credulous, and lead the seekers of popular- 
ity astray. 

We have shewn what were the precise and only 
terms offered by us to Great-Britain, that while we 
proposed simply to withhold actual hostilities, keep- 
ing on our Non-Importation law, which we declared 
to be the most efficient War measure, we demanded of 
lier not merely a correspondent cessation of captures 
and warlike measures, ])ut the immediate suspension 
of an interesting riglit during the Armistice, which 
might either be protracted by negotiation through the 
4 



36 

whole European war, or Great-Britain would have 
the odium of breaking it off, and thus give our cabi- 
net all tlie popularity and benefits, at iiome and a- 
broad, of waging a defensive war, in place of the odi- 
um of carrying on an offensive one. 

Nor were the inequality, and preposterous nature 
of tliese terms the worst features in the negotiation. — 
Our Grovernment and Minister took care not only to 
make Great-Britain perceive, that we were afraid to 
trust her during an Armistice, even after she had vol- 
untarily abandoned the two great formerly avowed 
causes of war ; but they reminded her of the vast in- 
juries she had wantonly committed upon us, and the 
unprecedented forbearance of the United States, and 
lest all this language and this extraordinary demand 
should not induce her to reject our proposals, orders 
were given to hint to her, that after these humiliations 
were submitted to, we had many ^^ rods in pickle,^^ 
for which she must prepare her Imperial back. 

^^ Although there are many jms^ and weighty caus- 
es of complaint against Great-Britain (says Mr. 
Madison, in his instructions for an Armistice, in his 
hollow instructions to make a shew of an Armistice), 
you will perceive that the Orders in Council, illegal 
Blockades, and Impressments ave of the, highest im- 
portance.^^ 

Gracious Heaven ! ! What hopes can that nation 
ever ha^e of arriving at an end of its labours ! ! The 
toils of Hercules, and the disasters of Job, have no 
comparison with them. — I had thought that the ten- 
derness of our government for Great-Britain had in- 
duced them and their editors, the National Intelli- 
gencer, Aurora, and Clironicle, to state to us all the 
various causes of dissatisfaction against her. — I 
had thought that after atoning for the attack on 
the Ciiesapeake, relinquishing all illegal Block- 
ades — rescinding the Orders in Council, and re- 
nouncing Impressments, there would remain no cause 
of dissatisfaction against Great-Britain ; but she is 



27 . 

now told^ that tliese are only the higher causes of 
coiuplaint, and tliat after she has submitted to all 
the humiliations demanded of her, our Attorney- 
General will then file a bill, and present a specifica- 
tion of the other ^' just and weighty causes of com- 
jHaiutJ' I can only say, that I never yet heard the 
bitterest enemy of England mention any other causes, 
than those enumerated by Mr. Madison. — What pos- 
sible encouragement then could the British cabinet 
have, to agree to our proposals, when they could see 
no termination to complaints, and pretexts, and caus- 
es, for avoiding an ultimate arrangement, and when 
the exclusion cf British trade, (the only real object of 
France in obliging us to enter into this m ar) w as to 
be continued until Peace should be finally conclud- 
ed? 

The government of Great-Britain lost no time after 
the war was known, in making to our cabinet propo- 
sals for an Armistice. These proposals were like all 
pn.'positions between equal states, perfectly recipro- 
cal. They require of us to suspend hostilities only, 
in consideration of suspending hostilities on their part. 
They are silent as to Impressments — and would any 
person enquire why ? It may be answered, that Im- 
pressments never had been presented to Great-Brit- 
ain as in themselves the cause oj' war — They had ex- 
isted prior to Jay's treaty, and tliat treaty was made 
without demanding their discontinuance — they con- 
tinued during the whole of Mr. King's residence in 
Europe, as well as during Mr. Monroe's, and the lat- 
ter also made a treaty in which they were left as the 
subjects of future arrangement. — How then could G. 
Britain presume tliat this would be on oiir part a sine 
qua nan of 8.\\ Armistice ? — Especially as the discus- 
sion on that topick with Monroe and Pinkney had 
shewn that many months would be required to ar- 
range it? 

The universal sentiment in England and America 
was, that if the Orders in Council and Blockades 



2S 

should be withdrawn, the cause of War woukl cease 
— at least it was supposed that hostilities might cease, 
and the other subjects be matter of negotiation for a 
definitive Peace. 

Our cabinet knew well that this state of things 
would take place — They knew from our minister in 
France, Barlow, that the French decrees had been 
repealed on the 28th of April, 1813. This was 
known here before the declaration of War. They 
knew equally well that Grcat-Bi-itain, according to 
lier pledge, would (as slie afterwards did) repeal the 
Orders in Council. — To prevent the effects which 
this would produce in this country. War was previ- 
ously declared — But the repeal of the Orders in 
Council might create clamours for peace in the Uni- 
ted States— Here too they liad their plaister for the 
wound. — A proposal must be made for an Armistice, 
and to the astonished cabinet of Great-Britain, fond- 
ly anticipating the return of peace by the repeal of 
the Orders in Council, tlie old subject oi her claiming 
her own seamen, so long and so often discussed and 
never before presented even as a sine qua non of a 
treaty, makes a splendid figure in the foreground, as 
a pi-eliminary even to a cessation of the shedding of 
human blood. Such is the difference in the propo- 
sals of the two cabinets — While the one repeals her 
obnoxious measure, and simply claims a mutual cessa- 
tion from hostilities ; the otlier presents at the very 
threshold of negotiation, a check mate which puts a 
period to the game of peace — We ask Great-Britain 
to yield, as a jJreliminary, what is well known slie 
would not give up without a substitute, until Dear- 
born shall have planted liis standard on the Tower of 
London. 



NO. V. 

OX THE REASONABLENESS OP THE OFFERS FOR AN 
ARiMISTICE. 

The jjrincijiles on which the practice of reclaiming 
their oicn citizens by helligerentSy is founded — its 
aiitiquiti/p and universality. 

We cannot decide, whether the proposals made 
by our cabinet were or were not reasonable, Avithout 
entering into a discussion and history of the claim 
whicii they required should be surrendered as a pre- 
liminary — There is no topick less understood, and 
precisely for the reason, that it has been so long and 
so much talked about. Every man fancies he under- 
stands the topick of every day's discourse, and there- 
fore gives lumself no trouble about it ; and every 
hour you meet young and old men talking most flip- 
pantly on this universally exercised right, without 
having examined any of the principles on which it 
is founded, any of the difficulties whicli attend its 
relinquishment by belligerents, any of the embarrass- 
ments whicli liave been, and which we fear and 
believe will forever be in the way of an adjust- 
ment of it, consistently with the mutual rights and 
interests of America and Great-Britain. There has 
been another obstacle to a right comprehension of 
this question — It has been always treated with pas- 
sion and ill temper. All nations are very jealous upon 
questions where they fancy their rights and their 
honour are concerned, but few are so extremely 
tender and so little ready to exercise their reason 
and their impartiality as a certain class of Americans. 
It is enough always for such men, that Great-Britain 
exercises a right which produces some inconvenience 
to us, or whicli reminds them of lier naval power, 
without stopping to inquire whether she is singular 



30 

in her pretensions, or whether we claim the same ioi 
ourselves. Indeed this description of overboiling 
patriots would be the very lirst men to cry Hosanna 
to any of our naval officers who sliould do a bold and 
questionable thing to any neutral nation, if that 
act should promote our interest or our glory. 

In examining this claim of taking out their own 
subjects from neutral merchant ships, by belligerents, 
we shall consider, 

1st. The principles on which it is founded. 

2d. Its antiquity, in point of usage by Great-Britain. 

3d. The ordinances of France, on the same point. 

4tli. The former negotiations on this subject be- 
tween us and Great- Britain. 

dth. The unalterable resolutions of Madison on 
that subject, as expressed in a letter which was writ- 
ten in 1807? to our ministers, chiding them for having 
dared almost to adjust it, and declaring that our flag 
must cover all English sailors who have been here 
two years, whetlier naturalized or not, both prospec- 
tively as well as retrospectively. 

It will appear from this last document, that there 
is no hope of an adjustment, because the oifer to ex- 
clude British sailors, lately made, is so expressed, 
as that it will admit of our employing them in one 
day after they have landed, if we make them ^Hmer- 
ican citizens — such we shall sliew must have been 
the intention. 

1st. We shall consider the principles upon which 
all belligerents claim the right to the service of all 
their citizens or subjects in time of war. 

It is one of the principles the most universally ad- 
mitted of any which we knoAv of, that allegiance and 
protection are reciprocal — that every nation has a 
right to the services of all its citizens in time of war 
— that the allegiance due from a native citizen en- 
dures during his life, and altiiough some liberal wri- 
ters contend for the right of expatriation, or a 
change of allegiance in time of peace, yet even these 
writers deny this right to any citizen when his coun- 



31 

try is at ivar. This maxim is a fundamental one of 
the common law of England, and has been adopted 
by us since our separation from that country. 

In a very famous case in Connecticut, which was 
tried before Judge Ellsworth, in whicli one Williams 
had attempted to change his allegiance, had obtained 
the rights of a French citizen, and had accepted a 
command in the French service, the Federal Court 
decided, that no American citizen could change his 
allegiance, and sentenced Williams to punishment 
for compromilting the neutrality of the United States, 
by entering into tiie service of a foreign state. The 
United States were then at peace, and of course our 
Courts adopted the narrowest possible construction ; 
for no writers deny the right of every country to com- 
mand the services of its citizens in time of war. 
France never retaliated this treatment of her natu- 
ralized and adopted citizens. 

Nations not only deny the riglit of a subject to change 
his country and allegiance in time of war, but they 
claim the right to the active services of their citizens 
in such times of peril. 

The impressment laws of Great-Britain, and the 
conscriptions of France, are proofs of this proposi- 
tion — and the United States contend for the same 
right. The drafting of their militia, which is a co- 
ercive measure, obliging the citizens who may happen 
to l)e drawn to military service, is of the same char- 
acter, and founded upon the same principles. 

Our Constitution has, to be sure, limited this pow- 
er by consent of the people, to the cases of " insurrec- 
tion, resistance to the laws, and actual invasion,''^ and 
has reposed the power of judging of tlie existence of 
these exigences, in the commanding officers of the 
several independent states ; but the right of drafting 
and forcing the militia into service, in case those ex- 
igences exist, is unquestionable, and proves the gen- 
eral proposition, that every nation has a right to com- 
mantl the services of its citizens in time of war. 



3S 

If allegiance, then, is perpetual, extending to the 
life of the citizen, and if that allegiance includes the 
obligation to render military service, it cannot be ne- 
cessary to shew, tiiat a man is bound to enter into the 
service of his native country whenever and wherever 
required. — Still less can it be necessary to shew, that 
two perfect rights cannot exist in two different coun- 
tries at the same moment to the services of the same 
man. 

A man may, however, contract a second obliga- 
tion — he may enter into a new allegiance by being 
naturalized in another country. — Such an allegiance 
is, however, inferior to the other, and cannot derogate 
from, or diminish the duty which he owed to his for 
mer sovereign. — The first obligation is paramount 
and superior, and whenever the two duties come into 
conflict, the second, later and inferior duty must yield 
to the first and tlie superior obligation. 

The only remaining question is, to what extent and 
in what places can the sovereign exercise this rigiit 
oyer the person and services of the citizen? Our 
Government contend that it can only be exercised in 
the country of which such person is a subject or citi- 
zen. — The writers of the laws of nations are silent on 
this subject. The reason of their silence as we ap- 
prehend, is, that until our country made it a question, 
every nation considered that it had a right to demand 
the persons and the services of its. citizens, in every 
situation where they were not under the territorial 
jurisdiction of another independent country. — We 
shall shew under our other heads that tliough writers 
on general law have been silent on the question, 
whether tlic sovereign power of coercing the citizens 
to military service may be exercised on tlie liigh seas, 
yet that the constant usage, the undisputed usage of 
all nations, is the cause of this silence — and that like 
many other universally admitted principles of nation- 
al law, necessarily resulting from certain acknowl- 



53 

edged rights, it is omitted merely because it was 
never questioned. 

The great question between us and Great-Britain 
is, whether her claim to demand and take her own 
seamen on the high seas, is a novel or unjust prin- 
ciple ? — Whether it is a violation of our rights, or 
an interpolation in the doctrines of international law ? 

The law of nations admits the right of belligerents 
to enter on board of neutral merchant ships for the 
purpose of making certain examinations. They have 
a right to examine, ist, Whether they are carrying 
articles contraband of war. — 2d, Whether the prop- 
erty be that of an enemy. — Sd, They have a right to 
examine strictly the persons on board, because if 
they are enemies, they have a right to take them out. 

Here, then, there is an end, by the acknowledged 
law of nations, to the absolute inviolability of the flag. 
The high seas ai*e by these acknoicledged and uni- 
versally admitted principles considered a sort of com- 
mon territory, in which certain riglits of belligerents 
may be exercised which are not permitted in neutral 
coiintHes. If then a belligerent may take out of a 
neutral ship jiersons owing allegiance to his enemy^ 
though shipped in neutral countries, it must be on tlie 
principle that the neutral flag on the high seas cannot 
protect all avIio sail under it. — It admits the right of 
examination and search, and seizure of persons as 
well as papers and goods. — These are undisputed 
and unquestioned riglits. — But if a belligerent can 
take out his enemy from a neutral ship merely because 
he may possibly injure him hereafter, with how much 
more reason can he take his own subject, who owes 
him perpetual allegiance and whose service he actually 
needs ? I shall siiew, in my next essay, that all the 
objections that have been urged against the claim of 
Great-Britain arising from the arbitrary and imper- 
fect nature of tiie inquiry by an ignorant and obsti- 
nate naval officer, apply as well in one case as the 
other. 

5 



34 



NO. VI, 

THE PRINCIPLES ON WHICH BELLIGERENTS CLAIM THE 
niGUT TO TAKE THEIR OWN SUBJECTS ON THE HIGH SEAS.— 
THE ANTIQUITY AND UNIVERSALITY OF THIS CLAIM. 

By the ordinances of France, it is provided, that 
neutral ships, in order to be entitled to the benefits of 
neutrality, must be navigated by a crew of which the 
captain, mate, and two-thirds of the seamen are sub- 
jects of the neutral country. — It is also provided, that 
no seaman shall be entitled to the privileges of a neu- 
tral citizen, unless he shall have been naturalized in 
such neutral country before the commencement of the 
war. 

One of the most popular objections to the claim of 
Great-Britain to search and take out her own sub- 
jects, is the one stated by Mr. Madison, in his war 
message, and that is, that seamen are by this practice 
subjected to the caprice and whim of every petty na- 
val ofRcer, without being entitled to the privilege of 
a trial by a court of law, a solemnity necessary to the 
condemnation of even a bale of merchandize. 

To this plausible objection there are various an- 
swers. — The same loose, informal, arbitrary mode of 
decision, is by tlie acknowledged law of nations suf- 
ficient to turn a ship out of its voyage — to defeat the 
best projected plans — to expose a crew to all the evils 
of capture and detention. — Even the American navy 
exercises the same arbitrary power over the persons 
and property of their fellow-citizens. — In a late case 
the Ariadne, owned by Mr. Goddard, of Boston, has 
been seized at the whim of a naval officer, tlie crew 
removed out of the ship and made prisoners, and the 
ship and cargo sent back for trial, when she had 
committed no offence. If it be said that the admiral- 
ty courts will give relief, by awarding damages in 
such cases, the answer is, that such damages are 



35 

rarely given, and are never adequate to the injury ; 
and it may be added, also, tliat every seaman illegally 
impressed has a like remedy, in the courts of law 
of Great-Britain, and if their poverty and friendless 
situation preclude them from seeking it, it is the duty, 
and it would be very easy for a neutral government to 
appoint agents to prosecute for damages, which we 
have no doubt would be honourably awarded in all 
cases of illegal detention. 

But the best answer to this objection to the univer- 
sal practice of belligerents of taking out their own 
seamen, is this, that the same caprice, the same infor- 
mal and uncontrolled authority is exercised rightfully 
by the law of nations, so far as respects enemies found 
on board neutral sliips. This would be found as ex- 
tensive an evil to neutrals, if a case should ever hap- 
pen in which a neutral and a belligerent should speak 
the same language, and the other belligerent should 
have as great a superiority as Great-Britain has upon 
the ocean. — In such a case, the neutral would often 
be exposed to seizure and detention, being mistaken 
for an enemy ; and all the objections which are made 
to the exercise of the right over his own subjects in 
neutral vessels by a belligerent would apply with as 
great force, and yet no question could exist as to the 
right. 

We have said, that one cause of the silence of 
writers upon the law of nations, as to the right of 
belligerents to reclaim their own seamen, when found 
within a common jurisdiction, like the high seas, was, 
that this right had never been questioned. — It was a 
right so superior to others which were admitted, that 
no man could raise a doubt upon it. Belligerents 
have a right to take out tlieir enemy's property and 
the persons of their enemy. — Would they not have a 
right to take out tlieir own property, forcibly, or frau- 
dulently, or improperly withheld? They have a right 
to take out their enemy's persons — have they not also 
a right to take out their own subjects, who owe them 
allegiance, and who have fraudulently or forcibly 



36 

withdrawn themselves from the duties which they 
owe their sovereign ? 

But there is another stronger reason why tliis sub- 
ject has not been discussed by writers on the laws of 
nations, — Until the present war^the cases of belliger- 
ents seeking tlie protection of a foreign neutral liag, 
were necessarily rare. Since commerce has become 
important, within the last two hundred years, the only 
nations which have been neutral have been Holland, 
Denmark, and Sweden. These nations overflowed 
with seamen. The belligerents have been England, 
France, and Spain. The English sailor had rather 
starve on board his own ships than seek an asylum 
in the merchant vessels of countries tiiiose habits, 
customs, and discipline are so diiferent from his own ; 
and as to French or Spanish sailors, so loose and 
dirty in their habits, a Dutchman or a Dane would 
never admit them into their ships, let their distress 
for seamen be ever so great. Besides, the laws of 
France and Spain are so severe that their seamen 
dare not enter into foreign service. 

But when the United States became neutral, tlie 
British sailor found an asylum in our service. — The 
high wages of neutral service, similarity of manners, 
language, food, and discipline, invited him to our 
employ. The habits also of our southern states for- 
bade them to enter the sea service, while their enter- 
prize induced them to attempt to rival us in naviga- 
tion. 

A friend of mine, who resided seven years in South- 
Carolina, assured me, that there was but one seaman 
from the port of Charleston, who was a native of that 
state.* 

From these causes, obvious, undisputed and gene- 
rally admitted, the British marine was stripped of its 
strength, and our southern states became clamorous 

*NoTE. The period, to wliich my friend alluded, was from l78f)lo 1793. 
There may be a few more 7mtives of that state in the sea service at this day — 
but the habits of all the southern states forbid their entering into that service. 
There are nati»e .\mericans who sail oat of the soutliein i)orts, but they are 
chiefly of northern origin. 



37 

for the riglii of naturalizing aiiil protecting all sailors , 
of whatever nation, and as the English furnished us 
seven-eighths of i\\\^ foreign mass, the evil became 
intolerable, and could be resisted only by the right 
of reclaiming them on the high seas. 

If, therefore, no other nation liad heretofore exer- 
cised this right — if it was even novel in Great- Britain^ 
surely this new case, and the extreme exigency of it, 
would have justified her in assuming tlie practice. 

For where is the sensible or candid man who will 
deny that the laws of nations, like municipal laws^ 
must vary and accommodate themselves to the changes 
in the commerce and relative condition of nations ? 
The whole law of bills of exchange and policies of 
insurance has grown up out of nothing within two 
hundred years ! And if the divulsion of a great em- 
pire, and the erection of an immensely powerful 
state, speaking the same language with the nation 
from which it is separated, shall liave created diffi- 
culties and embarrassments unknown to the ancient 
world, are there to be no changes in the usages of 
nations so circumstanced ? 

The narrow point of tlie question is. Has Great- 
Britain a right to the services of all Jier native citi- 
czens during war? We have shewn that she has. 
Do we withdraw from 10 to 40,000 of her seamen 
from her service ? It is admitted that we do. Ought 
she (if it was a neic question) to submit to this evil ? 
Clearly not, if she has power enough to remedy it. — 
Is it for our permanent interest to contest this point 
with her ? Most assuredly it is not — for by contest- 
ing it we not only admit a competition to tiie disad- 
vantage of our OAvn native seamen, but so far as the 
British seamen supply our wants, so far as tliey fill 
up the chasm which would be otherwise filled by 
native Americans, just in the same proportion do we 
neglect those means of power to which Great-Britain 
has been ever so attentive — so far do we despise the 
increase of our seamen, upon which the strength, and 



38 

opulence^ and respectability of all maritime nations 
depend. 

Under the show, then, of protecting our seainen,^ 
the southern states are really contending for a com- 
petition M^hich reduces their wages and lessens their 
number, and of course the force and independence 
of the nation. 

We have hitherto gone upon the idea that this 
practice of Great-Britain was a novel one — ^that it was 
a pretension which she has set up in hostility to us, 
or at least against us alone. We have just assign- 
ed reasons to shew that if this were true she could 
have a great deal to say — because the relation of 
our two nations is new and unexampled. — But we 
shall now proceed to shew, according to our se- 
cond proposition, that Great-Britain has exercised 
this right against all nations for more than two cen- 
turies — that she exercised it when we were a part of 
her dominions — that it was then a portion of our Com- 
mon Law, and that no nations pretended to complain 
of the exercise of this right, so far as it respected mer- 
chant ships. 

If this case shall be made out, and we pledge our- 
selves to do it in our next number, we ask all candid 
men whether it does not materially change the aspect 
of the question, and whether instead of demanding 
the relinquishment of this practice as a right, we ought 
not rather to negotiate for its abandonment or modifi- 
cation as a matter of compromise. — Evils there un- 
doubtedly are arising from this very similarity of 
language, which, wliile it enables us to make a deep 
wound in the British marine, also sometimes exposes 
an innocent American to be mistaken and impressed 
as a British subject. But I am persuaded that it will 
be seen in the end, that the only fair remedy for tlie 
evil, is the exclusion of all native British seamen 
from our service — This, however, is very different 
from what our cabinet propose, and is what they liave 
declared they never will agree to. 



39 



NO. VII. 



THE ANTIQUITY OF THE BRITISH CLAIM OF IMPRESSING 
THEIR SEAlNfEN ON THE HIGH SEAS OUT OF NEUTRAL 
MERCHANT SHIPS. 

The clamor which has been raised on this subject, 
arising from the occasional abuses of the exercise of 
this unquestioned right, has led many persons to sup- 
pose, that this is an usurpation on the part of Great- 
Britain, of modern date, and applied particularly a- 
gainst lis. — If it were generally known that this is 
an ancient usage, founded on universally admitted 
principles, and applied by her to all nations, even he- 
fore this country existed as a nation, all moderate and 
reasonable men would say that it could not and ought 
not to be expected, that an old and powerful nation 
should yield up its ancient usages merely because 
we saw fit to find fault with them. Judge Black- 
stone, wlio wrote before the separation of the two 
countries, and could therefore have no allusion to the 
present contest, lays it down as a settled maxim of 
the law of England, that " natural allegiance is per- 
petual and cannot be affected by a change of time, 
flace, or circumstance, nor can it be changed by 
swearing allegiance to another sovereign — The sub- 
ject may to be sure by such means entangle himself, 
but he cannot unloosen the bands which connect him 
with his native country.'' He cites a famous case of 
M'Donald, who went to France in his infancy, and 
had a commission from the French King, but being 
found in arms against his native country, he was tri- 
ed and convicted of treason ; nor does it appear that 
France ever complained or retaliated his conviction, 
as she probaldy contended, and we shall shew she 
has always contended, for the same principle. — We 
have adduced these opinions and this case as an an- 
swer to a plausible objection made by Mr. Madison, 
and seized with avidity by many persons, that as 



40 

Great-Britain naturalizes foreign seamen after two 
years service in her navy, she is inconsistent in refus- 
ing us the same right. — But tlie question is wholly mis- 
understood by some, and, we fear, purposely misstated 
by our cabinet. — Great-Britain does not deny our right 
to naturalize her sailors, but she denies our right to 
jji'otect them against her prior and superior claims. — 
Her laws admit that a man may emigrate, be natural- 
ized, and owe allegiance to a foreign state, but they 
deny that these facts absolve him from his first and 
natural allegiance. 

In order to make out the case of inconsistency against 
her, we ought to shew that she protects foreign sail- 
ors naturatized in her country against their own nat- 
ural sovereign — We challenge any and every man in 
the country to produce such an instance — No — With 
all her sins and oppressions, it will not be found that 
she has contradicted the principles on which her ma 
rine power reposes — principles consecrated by the 
universal practice of nations — by the decisions of her 
courts — by the writings of her most eminent jurists, 
and by her long diplomatick discussions with this 
country. 

No — If a solitary case of her refusal to acknowledge 
the rights of a natural sovereign, and of her setting up 
her own naturalization laws against natural alle- 
giance could have been found, it would not have es- 
caped the eagle eyes of Mr. Madison and his prede- 
cessor. 

Some persons, however, (and among the rest the 
late President Adams, when he went over to the pres- 
ent administration) were so aware that general prin- 
ciples and universal usage were in favour of the right 
of belligerents of impressment of their OAvn sailors on 
the higii seas, that they thought it best to strike at the 
root of the whole practice, by denying the right of 
impressment even in the territory of Great- Britain. — 
Mr. Adams took his notions from the doubts express- 
ed by some of the old writers. Sir Michael Foster 



i 



41 

jbas most learnedly proved its great antiquity, and tliQ 
invariability of the practice, and it has been clearly 
settled to be tlie common law of England, by Lord 
Mansfield and Lord Ivenyon — See Cowper 517. 5th 
term Reports 27^^ 

If then, by the common law of England, no man 
can change his allegiance, not even by residence from 
infancy in a foreign coujitry, nor by naturalization, 
nor by holding a commission under a foreign state, 
and if every seafaring man is by law liable to im- 
pressment within the realm, all which doctrines were 
settled before the divulsion of or separation of the two 
countries, and therefore ought not now to be question- 
ed by us, the only remaining point is, to inquire wheth- 
er Great-Britain has asserted and exercised this 
claim on board of foreign sliips, on a common juris- 
diction, the high seas^ and this too from very ancient 
times. 

The first instruction I have met v* ith, was one is- 
sued by the Earl of Northumberland, Lord High 
Admiral of England, to Sir John Pennington, dated 
April 4, 1640. 

'•As yoiL meet icith any men of war, merchants, or 
ffther ships or vessels, belonging to any foreign prince 
or state, either at sea, or in any road ichere you, or 
any of his J^lajesty-s feet may happen to come, you 
are to send to see ivhether there he any of His 
Majesty's subjects on hoard : and if any seamen^ 
gunners, pilots, or mariners, f whether JEnglish, 
Scotch, or Irish J he found on hoard, you are to cause 
such of His Majesty^ s subjects to be taken forth, and 
so disposed of as they be forthcoming to answer their 
contempt of his Majesty^ s Proclamation in that kind,^' 

By tlie proclamation here spoken of, is intended 
the usual proclamation issued l)y all sovereigns, and 
in the present war especially, by France, Denmark, 
Spain, and England, ordering home all their seamen 
from the service of foreign states, neutral, as well as 
belligerent. — The above cited instniction was r§t 
6 . 



peatedly carried into effect, and the particular cases 
are cited by writers on tliis subject. — In a very famous 
case in the year 1687? four Scotchmen and a boy 
were taken out of a Dutch ship of war, and complaint 
having been made by the Dutch government, it was 
referred to the Judge of Admiralty, Sir Richard 
Raines. — The Memorial complained that this prac- 
tice might be inconvenient to foreign ships in stress of 
weather, and would hiuder mercliant ships in their 
voyages, &c. To which Sir Richard Raines replied, 
^' As if His Majesty must be deprived of the use of 
his oivn subjects for his oicn expeditions, i\mi foreign- 
ers might use them for theirs.^^ 

We find that the same claims, the same objections, 
and the same rational and just answers were made in 
the reign of James II. as at tlie present day. In the 
reign, however, of Charles the II. great complaints 
having been made of the search oi' foreign ships of 
war, the instructions were modified so as only to in- 
clude merchant vessels, and the instructions and 
practice have continued the same from that jjeriod to 
the present. — The writers from whom I have o))tain- 
ed these important facts cite in support of them 
[Pepys MS Collection.] — As Mr. Pepys was the 
person who drew up the instructions, better authority 
cannot possibly ])e cited. 

It appears that these instructions have been execut- 
ted both against the Dutch and French, and liave 
been issued to every officer, in every war, for nearly 
two hundred years, and the writers who speak of the 
right in the reign of Cliarles the II. call it an ancient 
and acknowledged right. Would it then be reason- 
able to expect that Great-Britain should abandon the 
usage, and give up her ancient practice in favor of us 
alone, when the similarity of language, and the exten- 
sive practice of frauds in the granting certificates of 
protection, as well as the impositions in procuring 
naturalization, render the practic«; doubly important 
against us ? 



43 

Our havi2;ation, doubled in the space of ten years^ 
and yet it is absolutely imposible that our seamen 
could have multiplied in the same ratio — If. however^ 
we should suppose that the seamen increased in a 
full ratio to population, they would not increase more 
than 50 per cent, in ten years — hence there must have 
been a deficit of at least 10 or l.'>,000 seamen, all of 
w horn were supplied by Great-Britain. An English 
writer, on this subject, seems to be fully aware of the' 
extent of this evil, and of tlie nature of the frauds — > 
he gives two examples out of two thousand, which he 
says can be adduced- — ^^ Henry Donaldson made 
oath before the Mayor of Liverpool, that on the 15th 
of December, 1800, he procured a protection from 
Josluui Sands, collector of New- York, liy assuming 
tlie name of Henry JCent — that it was obtained on 
the oath of a woman, who swore for several other 
Englishmen on the same day — he said the woman 
was charged with having sworn to several hundred 
in a short time.'' Sworn to before Tho. Golightly, 
Mayor — Liverpool, May 17, 1810. 

Another impressed on the same day at Liverpool, 
had about liim a certificate signed by Mr. Graaf, De- 
puty Collector in Philadelphia, which he got by giv- 
ing an old man four dollars for swearing ^^ that he 
knew his father, mother, &c.'' whereas he had nei- 
tlier father or mother, as described, nor had he ever 
been in America. These and many other affidavits 
and documents have been taken by the British gov- 
ernment, and they w ell know the extent of these a- 
buses and the vast difficulty of remedying them by 
any act of Congress whatever. 

Great as has been the profit to the southern state? 
by the employment of British seamen, who, cither 
naturalized or not, have constituted three quarters of 
their crews, we find them talk of stipulations to e.r- 
cliide British seamen ! ! Do you belies e them in 
earnest? No — when you come to the provisions of the 
bill, you will find them require (as Mr. Madison said 



44 

tliey always should insist) that a seaman naturalized 
but one day beforei, or resident here two years, sliould 
not be considered a British sett77?a?7. Great-Britain 
knows these pretensions — She knows tliat three suc- 
cessive negotiations have failed ; one witli Mr. Pink- 
ney, 19 years ago — one with Mr. King, 12 years 
since, and the last with Messrs. Monroe and Pink- 
ney, five years since^ from the difficulty of proposing 
any remedy for mutual aljuses of acknoAvledged 
rights. What tliese proposals were we sliall shew 
hereafter. 



so. viii. 

DOCTRINES AND PRACTICE OF FRANCE, AS TO RECLAIMING 
HER OWN SEAMEN. 

It may perhaps be said, as it was by some persons 
in relation to tlie Berlin and Milan decrees, that tlie 
practice of Franco ought to be no justification to 
Great-Britain. We admit this to be true in some 
cases;, and with some qualification — But wlien we are 
discussing the existence of a right, under the laws of 
nations, we have no better mode of ascertaining it, 
ihan tlie long established usage of the greatest states 
in Europe. If France, under all her later monarchs, 
has set up the same principles, and has watched over 
the preservation of her seamen Avith a much more 
jealous a7id severe eye, than Great-Britain has done, 
we think it goes far to establish the existence of the 
right for wliich Great-Britain contends. If the t^N o 
great rivals of Europe liave, in all their maritime 
wars, united in admitting any one jmnciph, I think 
we may say of it, that it has much more claim to tlic 
place of ail unquestioned riglit, than many of the dog- 
mas which are laid down as such by tlie writers on 
publick laAV. 

I shall shew that France holds the doctrine of al- 
legiance being perpetual — that she is jjeculiarhj jeal- 



45 

oits of tJie claim over lier seamen, and is even cruel 
in lier laws, refusing them the right of expatriation— 
that while she recognizes, as does Great-13ritain,both. 
in her own practice and in that of other states, the 
riglit of naturalization^ siie undertakes to deny that 
this can give any new claims to protection to the natu- 
ralized person against his own sovereign. We shall 
shew that sJie goes farther, and denies to neutrals the 
right to naturalize her enemies^ so as to protect them 
against her arms. Lastly, it will be seen that by re- 
peated edicts slie authorizes the seizure of her own 
seamen in time of war, in her own ports, on board of 
neutral vessels-^-and at sea. 

The authority I shall cite will be Mons» Le Beau, 
now swperintendant, in Paris, of tlie details of the 
laws relative to the marine and colonies. I have, 
liowevcr, in every case taken (not the inferences of 
M. LeBeau) but the laws and ordinances themselves. 

By the laws of France, ever since the reign of 
Louis XIV, all French seamen are classed, and there 
are regular officers appointed to enrol and licence 
tliem — ^ without such an enrolment no man can exer- 
cise even the boat or fishing navigation. Thus the 
government knows every man in its marine service, 
for every man who is a sailor is considered as being 
a part of the marine. In time of jjeace, no man is 
permitted to ship a sailor without carrying him to the 
bureau or office of the class in which he is enrolled, 
and there getting him inscribed on his roll of equip- 
age. — In time of ivar, the commissaries of the classes 
themselves are forbidden to let any seaman be ship- 
ped either for the fishery, commerce or privateering, 
unless such seaman shall have his conge, or dismis- 
sion from the public marine. Thus in time of war 
France commands everij seaman in her dominions. 
Having thus explained the general police relative to 
seamen, I shall now proceed to the various statutes 
or ordinances which prove the points I have Jibove 
stated. 1st. The laws of France deny the right of 



46 

expatriation, and go farther than (xreat-Erihiin, be- 
cause they make tlie servin^^ on board the vessels of 
other nations, wliethcr enemies or not, a crime. 

By an edict of FebruarVj 1G.50, all masters of ves- 
sels, being Frencli su!)jects, are forbidden, whether 
they are domiciliated in France or not, that is, whether 
they have acquired anotJier domicil or home in a for- 
eign country or not, to talce commissions from, or use 
any other iiag than that of France, under the penalty 
of being treated as pirates. 

By an edict of August, I67O, the pain of death, 
which had been before ijitJicted upon all the subjects 
of France, found in the service of foreign states or 
princes, was changed for that of service in the gallieb- 
for life. 

This last edict is very clear, and from its 
language it is manilVstthat wlietlier taken in arms or 
not, against their ov\ 11 sovereign, tliey are liable to 
this punishment. 

By an edict of October, 1784? it is provided, that, 
^* Any classed seaman, who shall in time of peace be 
found serving in foreign ships, shall be sentenced 
to fifteen days confinement, antl reduced to the low- 
est wages, and shall serve two years extraordinary 
at the lowest rate : but tliose who in time of war 
shall be ARRESTEil) IN foreign ships, or jmss- 
ing into foreign countries, sSjall be sentencetl to three 
years service in the gallies.*' 

By the same edict, " It is made the duty of the 
chiefs or lieads of the department of classed seamen, 
to make search for tlie deserters from merchant ser- 
vice, to arrest them and send them to the officers of 
the admiralty. They shall also make known to the 
admiralty any classed seamen, wivo having paSvSED 
into foreign countries, sliall have l*een arrested." 

I have given a literal Iranslalion of the parts of 
these two passages which apply to the case, because 
this last edict was passed i]i a time of profound peace^ 
in the reign of Louis XA'L and is still in force. 



47 

It not only fiiUy jiistiiics my first position, that 
France denies that her seamen can expatriate them- 
selves; even in thue ot* peace, and that she makes it a 
severe crime in time of way for them to pass into anif 
foreign countries^ not excepting neutral states. But 
it supports, and is the great foundation upon which I 
repose, to prove that siie claims the right to arrest 
them on board neutral ships, either in French ports 
or on the high seas. We mnst suppose the French 
admiralty instructions to be conformable to, and as 
broad as their edicts. 

If so, they must instruct their marine officers to 
arrest any Fi-ench seamen ^^ found on board foreign 
shipsy ' This I admit may mean in the ports of 
France, and so far as this goes, it proves tliat the 
flag of a neutral does not cover all icho sail under it 
— ^and this part also corresponds to the British prac- 
tice of impressments in their ports. 

But it goes fartlier, it orders the arrest of sailors 
found on board neutral ships, or '* passing into for- 
eign countries," " on jiassant en jiays etrangers/^ — ■ 
this must intend found on board foreign ships on the 
HIGH SEAS — and surely the second section can have 
no other possible interpretation, because it applies to 
French seamen, who " having passed into foreign 
countries, shall be arrested.*' 

Lest any person disposed to cavil, and without ex- 
amining the question closely, should pretend, that 
these sections allude to seamen found on board ene- 
mies vessels — I answer, that upon seamen in that 
case, the pain of death is inflicted, and the first cited 
section of the edict of 1784, explicitly provides for a 
<'ase w hen France is at peace. 

We shall now shew that France pays no regard to 
{he naturalization laws of other countries, at least so 
as to deem them a protection to the subjects ^ of her 
enemy, who may have been naturalized during the 
war in neutral slates — and yet sh.e naiuralizes for- 
eigners herself — therelvv proving v.hni v. e have s\?.\ 



48 

ed above, that nations by conferring tlie privileges of 
naturalization do not understand, that they give the 
person any protection out of tiieir own territory, that 
they do not admit that it is in the power of a neutral 
to protect the native subject of an enemy against cap- 
ture, Mid a fortiori not the native subject of the bel- 
ligerent captor against his own sovereign's claim. 

By an ordinance of July, 170% it is declared that 
^^ No passports granted by neutral princes, either to 
owners or masters, who are subjects of our enemies^ 
shall be valid, unless they shall have been naturalized 
and have transferred their domicil before the jn'esent 
war.'' 

This edict is confirmed and continued by another 
in 17^1 and in 1778- 

If the simple principle of this edict should be ac- 
ceded to by our government, there would be an im- 
mediate settlement of the dilterences with Great-Brit- 
ain. She would be probably very willing to admit, 
that such of her subjects as were naturalized before 
the war should be protected under our flag. It ought 
to be observed, however, that this would be gi'atui- 
tous on her part, because she, as w ell France, con- 
tends for the perpetuity of allegiance. 

By a decree of the French republick, in the very 
height of her pretensions for free principles, dated Fri- 
maire, an. 5th, it is provided, that " All captains of 
neutralized vessels shall prove by certificates of their 
own minister near the French court, that they \A'ere 
born in an allied or neutral country, under pain of 
being treated as spies.'' 

Here the right of expatriation and the protection 
of naturalization are denied. 

Let us pause here a moment — William Duane, au 
Englishman naturalized in America, would by the a- 
bove edict be liable to be hung as a spy in France, 
noUvitlistanding his letters of naturalization, and his 
being covered by the American flag : yet Mr. Mad- 
ison contends that this same William J)uane would 



49 

he, perfectly protected on the liigli seas by this same 
paper against his own natural sovereign. 

By another decree, 8th Brumaire, an. 7* it is pro- 
videdj that 

^* All individuals, natives, originating in the coun- 
" tries of our allies or neutrals, who shall bear a cora- 
*' mission from our enemies, or make a part of the 
'' crews of vessels of war, or OTHERS, shall be 
" for this single fact declared pirates, and treated as 
*^ such." 

Both Gr. Britain and France had, for many years 
before, mw'iitd foreign sailors into their service, and 
had given them the privileges of native born seamen, 
or, as the French term it, of" Regnicoles,''^ yet nei- 
ther nation understood, it seems, by that stipulation that 
they could protect them either against their being 
punished for such entry, by their own sovereign, or 
their being treated as pirates by their enemies. 

By an edict of the year 6th, Ventose 8. it is de- 
clared, 

^'' That all English sailors, on hoard neuti'al flags, 
in the ports of France should be arrested; — and 
every man who spoke the English language should 
be considered English, unless he could prove by 
autlientick evidence and documents, that he was 
American." 

Here we see, what would be the state of our jpro- 
tections with a vengeance, had France been able to 
keep her fleets at sea during the war. Every Amer- 
ican or person speaking the English tongue, would 
be presumed English ! ! 

I shall not cite, as I could, many other edicts tend- 
ing to prove the same points, but shall conclude with 
stating one out of many eases in which France has 
carried these principles into effect on the high seas — 
that we liave not a thousand cases of the kind is be- 
cause her ships are scarcely ever at sea, and we have 
not 50 French seamen in our employ. In the year 
1806, Admiral Willaumez in a French ship called 

7 



50 

the Foudroyantj met with an American brig and for- 
cibly took out four French seamen, who had entered 
in this country : — not content with impressing them 
— he wrote as follows to Gen. Turreau, Ambassador 
of France : — 

^* My Lord — I have just apprehended four sea- 
men deserters, from the Valeureuse frigate, which I 
found on board an American brig, where they had 
engaged at 17 dollars per month. — Now, Sir, if you 
can succeed in making the American government pay 
down a compensation for thus seducing our seamen, 
you will punish it in a manner it feels most its ava- 
rice, as those people have been for three years sedu- 
cing our best men from us.'' 

Here we see the doctrine — the practice — and the 
Spirit to make us pay for it ! ! ! 



NO. IX. 

THE SEQUEL OF MR. RUSSELL'S CORRESPONDENCE WITH 
LORD CASTLEREAGH. 

It had been my original intention at this time, to 
have laid before the publick the negotiations between 
Mr. Monroe and Mr. Pinkney, and Lords Holland 
and Auckland, and to have shewn, not only the strong 
disposition of Grreat- Britain so to arrange the practice 
of taking out British seamen, as to afford little or no 
cause of complaint to this country, as also the almost 
insurmountable diiBculties which then presented them- 
selves. 

It will appear from this negotiation, that our gov- 
ernment knew the full extent of these difficulties, and 
that they could therefore very easily impose, if they 
were so disposed, on the American people, by renew- 
ing the general propositions in vague and indefinite 
terms, while they were sure that when they should 
come to the details, there were a thousand points 



51 

wliieli could be started, which would defeat an ulti- 
timate arrangement. 

In this spirit, we shall now shew, that the late ne- 
gotiation was probably undertaken, and that so far 
from proving a disposition to make peace, or to ar- 
range amicably the question of impressment, it aiibrds 
to my mind the most decisive proof of the opposite 
intentions. 

I am obliged to postpone the consideration ol the 
former negotiation, in order to take a review of the 
documents which have been given to us by piece-meal, 
since these essays were commenced. 

It will be recollected, that I undertook to shew in 
my early remarks, that Mr. Madison required of 
Grreat-Britain an absolute and entire relinquishment 
of the practice of taking her own seamen^ as a prelim- 
inary to an armistice, and that he offered, in return, 
the barren assurance that Congress might, if they 
should see fit, make a law excluding British seamen 
from our vessels, without defining either the terms of 
such an act, or what we should understand by British 
seamen. 

We also proved, that the explanatorij and last in- 
structions given by Mr. Monroe to Mr. Russell, and 
under ivhich alone he had any authority to treat, still 
renewed the offensive condition of a previous renun- 
ciation by Great-Britain of the right, as a preliminary 
to a negotiation about the manner, in which she was 
to be indemnified against the certain loss of her mar- 
iners. 

We have been indeed since' astonished and lium- 
bled at the boldness of our charge de affaires, Mr. 
Russell, in asserting in his last letter to Lord Castle- 
reagh, to which no reply could have been given from 
its date, that he had made an offer of a simultaneous 
relinquishment of the British right to take their own 
seamen, and of our practice, our unkind, impolitick 
and unneutral like practice of soliciting and employ- 
ing these subjects of a foreign state. 



52 

My first reflection was, that Mr. Russell had kept 
back from Lord Castlereagli his limited powers^, 
which forbad his making such an offer, and that he 
fondly entertained a hope, that overleaping his au- 
thority, he might have the honour, against his orders, 
and in direct disobedience of them, of restoring peace 
to his suffering country. 

With this impression, I again reviewed his instruc- 
tions, and I iiecame again convinced that he could 
not mistake them. The absolute, entire, and full re- 
nunciation of the practice, was required as preliminary 
to any sort of negotiation, and must precede the set- 
tlement of the terms on which we should refuse to 
employ British sailors. 

Imagine tlien, fellow-citizens, what was my sur- 
prise in perusing the late letter, probably gotten up 
at Washington, in which Mr. Russell states that he 
communicated his instructions, limited as they were, 
in e.vtenso, and that Lord Castlereagli " read them 
over attentively.^^ 

Instructions, which simply authorized him to renew 
the very same offensive proposals which had before 
been rejected. 

That the people may understand the nature of Mr. 
Jonathan Ylxx^^^Ws familiar talk with Lord Castle- 
reagh, it is proper here to premise one or two remarks. 

By a declaration of war, all the functions, power, 
and authority of ministers cease. Our own cabinet 
refused to accredit Mr. Baker as charge d'affaires 
appointed by Mr. Foster after the war — see the cor- 
respondence on this subject. 

Mr. Russell was therefore in London as a private 
American merchant. When he carried a letter from 
Mr. Monroe to himself, after the war, to Lord Castle- 
reagh, he did it as an individual American. He could 
say no more for his government than the letter said — 
If he promised any thing, it was Mr. Russell's pro- 
mise, and no better than Mr. Williams', or any other 
American citizen in London. 



5B 

Mr. Monroe's letter then is the t^me and only prop- 
er evidence of the offer, and Mr. Monroe required 
Gi'eat-Britain instantly to renounce her practice of 
taking her own seamen, on the assurance that Con- 
gress might, but that the President could not, by our 
laws, stipulate that they would pass a law something 
about the employment of British seamen. — As to 
what that law should be, Mr. Monroe was silent, and 
permit me to add, he was properly silent, for it was 
not in Mr. Madison's power to say that he himself 
should be President, much less to decide what Con- 
gress should or should not do. 

This, then, is the famous offer to Great-Britain — 
Withdraw your practice, consecrated by your own 
usage and that of all other nations for two hundred 
years, and then we will appoint commissioners to 
agree upon the terms of a law to exclude British 
sailors from our vessels, and if those commissioners 
shall make such terms as shall be agreeable to Con- 
gress, it is probable that that body will pass a law in 
conformity tliereto. 

We wish then the publick to consider Mr. Russell's 
oifers as nothing and less than nothing, so far as they 
exceed his explicit instructions. 

There is one other consideration on this subject, 
which deserves the most serious attention. — This ques- 
tion had been discussed between the two nations for 
20 years. To expect that Great-Britain would yield 
to our arms before any blow had been struck, what 
she had refused to our arguments and paciiick offers, 
is to suppose, that she is the most cowardly and hum- 
ble of all nations. If we liad offered a cessation of 
hostilities, and a free discussion of the question of 
impressment, without demanding the recognition of 
its injustice, something migiit have been exjx'ctcd. 

I have now, however, only begun with Mr. Ilus- 
sell's new and well-contrived communications. 
These remarks are merely introductory. One prop- 
osition all reasonable men will admit, that it is safei^ 



54 

much safer, to trust to that part of the oflBcial corres- 
pondence where both parties are mutually heard in 
their oivn language , than to any ex parte, subsequent, 
unanswered representations of one of the parties. 

This remark has the more force, I hei; the people 
to attend to it, w hen the person who gives the subse- 
quent and ex parte statement depends on a govern- 
ment for his support — which government lias waged 
an unnecessary war, and is determined to support it 
from a regard to consistency, as well as from the 
original unaccountable motives^ which urged it to 
declare such a war. Such a man, so pensioned by 
the goyernment, I mean in its pay, is the less to be 
trusted, when lie avows that he thinks his statement 
ought to unite all men in a vigorous prosecution of the 
war. He ought still more to be distrusted, wben his 
statement is olfered under such suspicious circumstan- 
ces as to date, purporting to be dated at London, on 
the 17th of September, when on the 19th of that 
month he writes, tliat be has not had time to communi- 
cate it. — It will be thought worthy of still less confi- 
dence, when I shall shew, that he begs pardon for 
having made it without authority, and when he plain- 
ly intimates that he made it with very little hope of 
its being accepted. — It will then be deemed, I be= 
lieye, a mere inise de guerre. 



NO.X. 

THE SEQUEL OF THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN MR. RUS- 
SELL AND LORD CASTLEREAGH. 

Every fair man and every friend to honourable 
Peace, every one who is ready to admit, that as our 
government plunged us into an offensive war, not 
only before we were duly prepared for it, but when, 
from recent events in G. Britain, it is apparent, that 
it might and ought to bave been avoided, will a^ree 



55 

with me, that it is at least possible, that the same 
administration, urged by the same motive, may have 
made Vishew of pacifick proposals, without any sin- 
cere design to have them accepted. 1 ask not for 
your jealonsy, my fellow citizens, I only request 
your candid and impartial inquiry into the pretend- 
ed offers for Peace. 

You will then agree with me, that it is necessary 
to make a marked discrimination between the writ- 
ten proposals^ and the written answers, and any 
verbal and oral communications, which may have 
been misunderstood, and most easily misconstrued 
and misrepresented. 

I shall, however, examine both, and I feel the 
most unlimited confidence that both of them will re- 
sult in a conviction that no Peace was expected or 
wished for on the part of our administration. 

First, then, we will examine the written corres- 
pondence between Mr. Russell and Lord Castle- 
veagh, after the former had received his last, and as 
he calls them, most liberal instructions from Mr. 
Monroe. 

Mr. Russell's on/?/ letter containing proposals af- 
ter he reoeived his last instructions, is dated the 
13th of September, in which he proposes, '' A con- 
vention for the cessation of hostilities, to take effect 
at such a time as shall be mutually agreed upon, 
and stipulating that commissioners shall be appoint- 
ed with full powers to form a treaty, which shall 
provide by reciproacal arrangements, for the security 
of their seamen from being taken or employed in the 
service of the other power." 

These are the precise words, and we admit that 
this part of the letter does not seem to imply that 
Gr. Britain should yield the right as a preliminary. 
If this had stood alone, (>. Britain zgvMS. not have 
refused the offer justly, except on the ground that 
Russell was not only not authorized by the instruc- 



56 

tions which he communicated to Lord Castlereagk 
in txtenso, but he was explicitly restrained from such 
an offer — Such an objection, if made would have 
been unanswerable and it is the very answer which 
Lord Castlereagh did make. 

Peruse, my fellow-citizens, these instructions, 
and take with you, the fact that Russell's diplo- 
matick powers had wholly ceased, and then see 
whether the refusal of Great-Britain is any proof 
of her being unwilling to adjust this question with 
any person duly authorized to treat with unlimited 
powers. 

But this is only a small part of the case— Rus- 
sell did not dare to violate in so open a manner his 
instructions- — He therefore added, ^'•' In proposing 
to your Lordship these terms, I am instructed to 
come to an understanding with his Majesty's gov- 
ernment, without requiring it to h^ formal concern- 
ing impressments comprising in it the discharge of 
citizens of the United States already impressed." 

What were the commissioners then to consider ? 
Whether Grre at- Britain should relinquish the right ? 
No — That she was to agree to do by a clear but 
informal understanding. 

The Commissioners were afterwards to agree, if 
they could, to some arrangement to supply the place 
of impressment 

I can liken this case only to a familiar one in 
private life — One man claims a right of way over 
his neighbour's land — the other denies it. The lat- 
ter offers to leave it to men, to say what compensa- 
tion he shall receive for the relinquishment of it, 
but. says he, joumn^i first come to an informal un- 
derstanding that you have no right of ivay, and then. 
I will leave it to men to agree, if they can, what 
shall be an equivalent to you for giving it up. — 
This however is not so strong as Mr. Russell's pro- 
posals. To make it equally absurd, you must add^ 



57 

^* After the referees have agreed upon tlie compeiv 
satioii, I must be at li])erty to say, whether I will 
give it or uot, because I am a man who am not in 
the habit of agreeing to or abiding by the deci- 
sions of any one." 

Is this the language of Mr. Russell ? Is it possi- 
ble that he could have said this to Lord Castlereagh? 
He did say it. "Your Lordship is aware that the 
power of the government of the United States to 
prohibit the employment of British Sailors must be 
exercised in the spirit of the constitution." Or, as 
it was more fully explained in his instructions, 
" Congress might, and it is probable that they would^ 
fulfil the contract made by the executive." 

From this view of the only written offer made to 
Lord Castlereagh, under the last liberal instructions, 
it is manifest, that commissioners could not be ap- 
pointed until Great-Britain had clearly but infor- 
mally pledged her honour to abandon the practice of 
taking her own seamen ; that the commissioners 
had only the power to agree, if they could, upon a 
substitute — and that after all Congress might say 
that the spirit of our free constitution forbade them 
to refuse to naturalize any British seamen. 

Lord Castlereagh received these offers as any 
honest plain man of common sense would receive 
them — he considered them as only a covert mode 
of renewing the same proposals that had been re- 
jected, and that they delivered up Great-Britain 
bound hand and foot into the power of Mr. Madison. 

Here the negotiation in Avriting ended. 

Mr. Russell, however, thought that by a familiar 
inofficial conversation, he could persuade Lord Cas- 
tlereagh to abandon his ground, and he has given 
to the publick the minute remarks of each party in 
this conversation. 

We must repeat that in a case of srch vital impor- 
tance, wliere a strong partizan of administration un- 
8 



58 

dertakes to represent the terms and |3recise expres- 
sions of a foreign minister in a long conference; and 
where he shows a disposition to give the most un- 
favourable turQ to the whole discussion, much al- 
lowance ought to he made. Much allowance for 
misapprehension — much for prejudice — much for 
the mortification of a young man in failing to effect 
a favourite object where he avows he acted without 
authority. 

Much ought also to be allowed for the mistakes 
of a very inexperienced diplomatick agent, who got 
into his office in a very unusual manner, converted 
from a supercargo into a sort of minister, and who, 
according to his own avowal, ventured to do what 
Mr. Madison said he dared not do, that is to stipu- 
late in behalf of Congress what sort of a law they 
would hereafter pass as to naturalization. 

Besides this, Mr. Russell has been before the 
publick in a former case, and few of us have forgotten 
his most memorable letters from France — while 
with a truth and spirit becoming the representative 
of an honourable and impartial nation, (I do not 
say administration) he was telling the French 
government, that there had not been a single case 
which proved the repeal of the French decrees, he 
wrote to our minister in Great-Britain that there 
had not been a case which rendered their repeal 
doubtful. 

We do not quote words — we adhere to the sub- 
tance — the whole is upon record, and let Mr. Rus- 
selPs consistency and credit be tested by his writ- 
ings. At present, however, we shall presume his 
account of the correspondence as correct as could 
possibly suit his employer, Mr. Madison. 

And what results from it ? We shall state : 

ist. It appears that Lord Castlereagh saw his 
whole instructions, and read them over attentively. 

2dlij. That he objected to treating with Mr. 



59 

Russell, because he had no authority whatever to 
negotiate on the subject, beyond his mere letter from 
Mr. Monroe. 

Sdli/. That Lord Castlereagh frankly stated the 
insurmountable objections which had formerly been 
made to the renunciation in toto, of tbe practice of 
taking British seamen; and that no British minister 
w ould dare to surren der so undoubted and long 
exercised a right. 

4tthly. That Mr. Russell very offensively, and 
we should say very petulantly and insultingly^ 
compared the British practice of taking their own 
seamen, to the slave Trade ,* thereby intimating 
that a British subject serving his king and country 
is in the condition of a West India or Virginia 
negro. 

dtJily. He charged the British government with 
gross inconsistency in keeping up the practice of 
impressing their own seamen, while they abolished 
the Slave Trade — thereby indecorously and unnec- 
essarily attacking and interfering with the munici- 
pal laws and usages of Great-Britain. 

Qthhj. He unjustly and insultingly charged Great- 
Britain with claiming the right to impress Ameri- 
can citizens, which she has openly and frequently de- 
nied, always restoring such as have been taken by 
mistake. 

But lastly, (and the most important of all his 
strange proposals) he claimed the right, without 
authority, of retaining all British subjects now nat- 
uralized, sind luidaviook to stipulate that Congress 
would not in future protect any British seamen. 

The whole of this last proposal was not only 
without authority, (and he apologizes for it as such 
to his own government) but it was in direct oppo- 
sition to his instructions, wiiich directed him to as- 
sure Great-Britain that the President could not by 
the constitution, stipulate for Congress. 



60 

Why then was it made ? He gives you the rea- 
son — because he thought it would unite all Ameri- 
caus in favour of the war — and because he knew 
his want of authority, and the extravagance and 
looseness of the terms would, as they did, secure 
the rejection of them by Great-Britain. He had 
probably an ulterior reason — He knew it did not in 
any degree commit our cahhiet, who rejected, with- 
out ceremony, a treaty lawfully made with full pow- 
ers, by Monroe and Pinkney, while it might, as it 
probably has done, recommend him to them as a 
man well fitted for the purposes and views of a 
cabinet, which has plunged the nation into ruin and 
disgrace, and which appears resolutely bent on con- 
tinuing the same ruinous system. 



NO. XL 

TRE IMPORTANT NEGOTIATION OF MESSRS. MONROE AND' 
PINKNEY IN 180C, AS TO IMPRESSMENTS. 

It is impossible to understand the true merits of 
the question of Impressments, and of the ofl'ers 
made between the parties at different periods, with- 
out a thorough examination of the negotiation tve- 
tween the Fox ministry and Messrs. Monroe and 
Pinkney. 

We may lay it down as a settled point, that wiiat- 
ever that ministry so favourable to America, for so 
many years our defenders in Parliament refused to 
concede, whatever especially they declared that no 
British minister would ever dare to cede, never will 
be granted even at the end of a war, until the Brit- 
ish naval power sliall be broken down. Our gov- 
ernment know, and it is our present object to show 
from documents, that the most favourable British 
ministers have declared, that on no terms whatever 
eaa they ever yield to any nation their right to take 



61 

their own subjects out of neutral ships^ on the high 
seas. 

If tiierefore ive insist that any treaty of peace, even 
a definitive one, must stiimlate that Great-Britain 
shall renounce this right, (we care not what terms 
of compensation or compromise are offered for its 
renunciation) we are persuaded that peace will ?ieiJ- 
er h-i made. This our administration well kvou', 
and therefore this renunciation will be made a sine 
qua non of a treaty, let Great Britain offer, as she has 
done, the most honourable propositions for the pre- 
vention of abuse, in the exercise of her right. 

This conduct of our Administration is, in effect, 
nailing the flag to the mast, and the ship must go 
down^if the people are weak or prejudiced enough 
to believe, without examination, that our flag, by the 
law of nations, ought to protect all who sail under it, 
and that Great Britain advances principles against 
us, which she maintains against no other nation, and 
no other belligerent nation maintains ; the reverse 
of all which is precisely the truth. 

We know we shall alarm some timid men, when 
we say, that we fear peace will never be made if, 
upon any terms or on any conditions, we require the 
absolute relinquishment of the right to take British 
native subjects out of our merchants, ships on the 
high seas. 

But we see no advantage in self-deception. We 
shall never make up our minds either to fight ad in- 
ternecioncm, to extermination, for this principle, or 
to make a peace without obtaining it, until we do 
understand that it never will he yielded. Then men 
will begin to think — they will then weigh the jus- 
tice of the British claim — its antiquity — its univer- 
sality — its true importance to us — the exaggerated 
picture which has been drawn of it — on the other 
side its being so essential to the vital interests of 
our enemy — the prosperity we have enjoyed for 



6S 

twenty years under its exercise — ^the gross abuses 
of protections for sailors — as well as the great facil- 
ities for naturalization — the doubtful benefit of 
the encouragement of foreigners at all — the certain 
disadvantage to our native mariners by the compe- 
tion — ^by the difficulty of discrimination which draws 
even natives into danger — by the little reliance you 
can place on the fidelity of men in case ofwa)', who 
are fighting against their own sovereign. 

Such arguments will have their due weight when 
we once knoic, that the icar must be eternal, or we 
must abandon our claim on Great Britain to re- 
nounce her natural, moral, equitable right over the 
services of her own subjects. 

Our government perfectly well understand this^ 
but they know the people do not, and therefore they 
continue to make the parade of offers, which have 
been over and over again rejected, as it is our busi- 
ness to shew. The correspondence on the subject, 
atthetime of tlie negotiation iu 1806, comprises six- 
ty or seventy pages, we shall therefore arrange the 
points which appear to be fairly deducible from that 
negotiation, and give short abstracts under each 
point. 

ist. Then, it will appear that G. Britain abso- 
lutely and explicitly refused to renounce the right 
of taking her own seamen, and our ministers were 
persuaded that it never would be renounced. 

^d. We shall shew, that her negotiators made 
very honourable offers to ours to render the exercise 
of her right as little injurious as possible to us. 

Mly. That our negotiators deemed these offers 
liberal, and were of opinion that, substantially, they 
gave us all that we could desire — they were con- 
vinced that they were the best modifications short of 
a surrender of what Great Britain tenaciously in- 
sisted upon as an absolute right. 

4tthly. It will appear that our ministers were se 



63 

crely reproved for their liberality, by our cabinet, 
find in lieu of tlie informal arrangement made before, 
they Avere instructed to propose an article precisely 
in the spirit of Russell's late iinaidlioriteA offer^ 
that is, that we would protect all citizens whether 
natives or not, but we would not employ any En- 
glishman until he had gone through the farce of 
naturalization. 

We tliink this display will shew, that our gov- 
ernment are well persuaded they can fearlessly, and 
U'itJiout danger of peace, (the thing they most dread) 
make as many oifers as they i^lease, so long as they 
insist on the renunciation of the right, and on the 
validity of our naturalization laws to wash away 
the duties of natural allegiance — duties, in which 
more writers ou the law of nations are agreed, than 
in any other principles Avhatever. 

Is/. It appears from Mr. Monroe's and Mr. 
Pinkney's correspondence, as to the aforesaid nego- 
tiation, that Great Britian refused to yield up her 
right, and it was apparent she never would yield it 
on any terms. 

In "a conference of Monroe and Pinkney with 
Lords Holland and Auckland, on the 22d August 
1806, these noblemen, who were very friendly to 
our nation, observed, ^^ that they felt the strongest 
nepugnance to si formal renunciation of their claim 
t6 take from our vessels on the high seas such sea- 
men as should appear to be their own subjects ; and 
they pressed upon us with much zeal, as a substitute 
for such abandonment, tliat our crews should be fur- 
nished with authentick documents of citizenship of 
a nature and form to be settled by treaty, whicli 
should cnmpletehj protect those to whom they re- 
lated, but that, subject to such protections, Great 
Britain should continue to visit and impress as here- 
tofore,'^^ (that is their own subjects.) 

" They enforced this by observing that they sup- 



64 

posed our object to be to prevent the impressment 
of American seamen, and not to withdraw British 
seamen from the service of their country, in times of 
great national peril, in order to employ them our- 
selves ; that their proposal would efi'ect this object, 
that if they should consent to make our commercial 
navy an asylum for all British seamen, the effect 
of such a concession upon her maritime strength, on 
which Great Britain depended, might be fatal." 

It is evident from this extract, that even the Fox 
ministry, so favourable to America, never could think 
of yielding the principle. It is apparent also, that 
they were willing to adopt, and did offer, a very fair 
expedient to remedy abuses in the exercise of the 
right. Lastly, it seems from this extract, that G. 
Britain is not so mueh opposed to this relinquish- 
ment on account of the number of her sailors, now 
in our service,' as from her fears, that as soon 
as our navy shall by treaty become an asylum, no 
stipulations on our part can prevent its being abus- 
ed to the utter destruction of her marine power. 

On the 11th of Sept. our ministers write that they 
consider the objections of Gi'eat-Britain such as will 
not be surmounted. 

^^ All our efforts, they say, proved ineffectual. The 
right was denied by the British commissioners, who 
asserted that of their own government to seize its 
subjects on board neutral merchant ships on the high 
seas. And who said, that the relinquishment of it 
at this time would go far to the overthroio of their 
naval poiver, on which the safety of the state essen- 
tially depended.'' 

Our ministers at the same interview, in Sept. 1806, 
proposed as a substitute the restoration in future of 
all British deserters even, from their merchant ser- 
vice — to this proposal the British ministers appear- 
ed to listen, but they said it Avas necessary to consult 
their law officers, and the result was as our minis- 



05 

ters state ^^ a rejection t)f the project and with it all 
hope of obtaining at that time any satisfactory stipu- 
lations respecting Impressments/' 

At their next interview tlie British commissioners 
presented the report of their crown officer, declar- 
ing his opinion ^' that Great-Britain had a right to 
the services of her own citizens, and to take them 
out of neutral merchants' ships on the high seas — 
that as merchant ships were extra-territorial they 
were not admitted to possess such a jurisdiction as 
to protect British subjects from their own sovereign 
— they stated furtl I er that the admiralty and all the 
crown officers had been consulted and they added 
explicitly, though in a very conciliating manner, 
that it was not in their power to accede to our pro- 
posal, and that all the law officers united in the o- 
pinion, that the right of their government was ivell 
founded and ought not to be relinquished. They 
added that under such circumstances, the relinquish- 
ment of it was a measure which the government could 
not adopt Avithout taking upon itself a responsibility, 
which no ministry could be willing to meet, howev- 
er pressing the emergency might &e." 

Here ended the negotiation as to the absolute re- 
nunciation of the right, and we ask all candid men 
whether we have not fully maintained our first point, 
that tliis negotiation proved tliat Great Britain will 
never relinquish the rights however pressing the 
emergency may be. 

Let it be considered wKo were the British negotia- 
tors — ^men, who for ten years had condemned the Pitt 
ministry for their unbending, unconciliatory conduct 
towards America — men whom Monroe most extrav- 
agantly praised — men up6n whom Mr. Madison 
himself has since repeatedly bestowed high eulogi, 
ums. Yet these men declared that such were the 
feelings of the British nation — so united were all its 
t'ivilians on the justice of their claim, that no minis 
9 



66 

try would ever dare to relmquish it. And do we 
say that she never will in any event relinquish it ? 
NO — She may do it, not because the Canadas shall 
t)e wrested from her — but she may do it, when the 
American flag shall ride triumphant in the Downs, 
when our Navy shall have acquired the supremacy 
which hers now possesses on the ocean, and when 
the wishes of France for her downfall shall be ac- 
complished. 



NO. XII. 

MB. MONROE AND PINCKNEY'S NEGOTIATION ABOUT lAf- 
PRESSMENTS. 

During Mr. Fox's indisposition, which ended in 
his death, our ministers had one interview with Lord 
Grenville — and I quote it to shew, that another lead- 
ing man in the same nation had the same feelings as 
Lords Holland and Auckland. His Lordship said 
he^^ Had doubts of the practicability of devising means 
of discrimination between the seamen of the two 
countries within their respective jurisdictions, and he 
spoke of the importance to the safety o/Grreat-Britain, 
in the present state of the poicer of her enemy, of pre- 
serving in their utmost strength, the right and the 
capacity of government to avail itself in war of the 
services of its seamen. TJiese observations were 
connected with professions of an earnest wish, tliat 
some liberal and equitable plan should be adopted 
for reconciling the exercise of this essential right 
with the just claims of the United States for remov- 
ing from it all cause of complaint and irritation.'' 

Not one word a])out the renunciation ; on the otb- 
cr liand tlie most firm and delil)crate purpose of ad- 
hering to it, on tlie most deep and solemn conside- 
rations. If British statesmen believe it to be a right, 
and a riglit essential to their safety and existence, is 
it not idle to expect a formal renunciation of it ^ 



67 

But we have said, secondly, that the British com- 
missioners have made very honourable offers for such 
arrangements as would take away all just cause of 
complaint. 

One of tliese we have already noticed, and that is, 
that a, form and mode of j^^^otection for American sea- 
men should be agreed upon by treaty, and that no 
seamen possessed of one of them should be impress- 
ed. 

If the object of Mr. Madison was only to protect 
honafide Americans^ one would imagine this might 
have answered. 

On tlie 11th of September, after the British com- 
missioners gave in their final declaration, that no 
British minister would ever dare to concede the right, 
they, the British commissioners, presented a counter 
project, reciting, '^ Whereas, when one nation is at 
war and the other at peace, it is not lawful for tlie bel- 
ligerent to impress or carry off from the neutral ves- 
sel seafaring persons who are the natives of the neu- 
tral country, or others, who are not the subjects of the 
belligerent, and whereas, from similarity of lan- 
guage and appearance it may be difficult to distin- 
guish the subjects of the two states, the high contract- 
ing parties agree for the greater security of the neu- 
tral subjects, they will respectively enact such laws 
as shall subject to heavy penalties the commanders 
of belligerent ships, who shall carry off the subjects 
of the neutral on any pretence whatever." 

A penalty is also provided for granting false pro- 
tections to seamen. 

I confess 1 can scarcely conceive a fairer offer — It 
is a most express disavowal of the practice of taking 
Americans, or any other seamen, except British. 
Tlic remedy it offers might be made effectual. If 
every captain of an xlmerican vessel from which any 
neutral citizen should be impressed, should be di- 
rected by law, under heavy penalties, to take down at 



68 

the time of shipping any seamen^ his descrijytion ctnd 
place of nativity, and on the arrival of the vessel at any 
foreign or other port, he should Ijc required to trans- 
mit in duplicates to the secretary of state, and to the 
publick agent of seamen in London, the names, de- 
scription, and places of nativity of any and every sea- 
men who shall have been impressed during the voy- 
age, stating by whom and where the same took place 
— and if the law should direct the secretary of state 
to send to the place where the seaman so impressed 
was born, for the certificate of some rector, pastor, 
or publick teacher, together with one civil magistrate, 
attesting that such seaman was born in such place, 
and if it should be agreed by treaty, that such cer- 
tificate, countersigned liy our secretary of state, 
should be in a trial at law j^rima facie evidence of the 
fact, and if the treaty should further provide, that the 
American agent in London should have a right as 
the prochain ami of any seaman to institute suits for 
the penalty against the captain who should have im- 
pressed such seamen, and if the penalty should be an 
heavy one, as was proposed by Great- Britain, and 
should ensue to the benefit of the seaman, and if 
moreover the seaman should be instantly discharged 
on the production of said certificate, we cannot con- 
ceive a more perfect security than this would afford 
against impressments. If the penalty should be .'lOO 
dollars, for example, and the government of the Uni- 
ted States and its officers should do their duty, the 
seaman would recover it upon an average within 
twelve months, and there is scarcely a seaman in 
America, who would not be anxious to he impressed 
on speculation — nor a captain in the British navy who 
would dare to impress an American. The only dan- 
ger the seaman would incur, would be the neglect 
of his own government. Tlie remedy in the mode 
proposed would be certain, easy and expeditious. 

But this proposal was rejected — Why ? Because 
it afforded no asylum to British sailors. 



69 

The British ministers finding this proposal reject 
fed, then addressed a note to our ministers statins';v 
*' That instructions had been given and should be re- 
peated and enforced^ for the observance of the great- 
est caution in the impressing British seamen, and 
that the strictest care shall be talien to preserve the 
citizens of the United States from any molestation or 
injury ; and that immediate and prompt redress shall 
be afforded upon any representation of injury sustain- 
ed by them." 

Such is the famous note presented by tlie Fox 
ministry as their ultimatum, and which was so satis- 
factorv to both our uesiotiators, as to induce them to 
sign the treaty. 

If in addition to these liberal instructions the other 
proposal or project had been accepted, of awarding a 
heavy penalty against any British officer who should 
impress an American, the great cause of complaint, 
so favourable to the views of an administration that 
seeks to prolong the irritation between the two coun- 
tries, might have been long since removed. 

We now proceed to shew, thirdly, that these last 
terms were satisfactory to our oicn negotiators — and 
that they contained a great deal more than meets the 
eye — because, although Grreat-Britain declined a re- 
linquishment of the claim, yet the " high seas'' werev 
purposely omitted in the proposal, and it was under- 
stood that the right would only be exercised in the 
British territories. 

Our ministers, speaking of this offer, say, " That 
it M as sent to us as a publick paper, and it was in- 
tended we should so consider it, and with the knowl- 
edge and approbation of the British cabinet. It 
ought therefore to be held as obligatory as if it had 
been stipulated in a treaty. It is just also to give it 
a liberal construction, in consideration that it is the 
act of the British government. In that view it mer- 
its attention, that every thing is expressed in it that 
could be desired,, except the relinqiiishment of the 



i... 



70 

principle^^ — " that in speaking of imprcssmencs, tne 
exercise of tliat act on tlie high seas is omitted, an o- 
mission we know to have been intentional." 

Two years after this fair proposal — I call it faivf 
because our jpresent attorney-general, Pinkney, and 
our jpresent secretary of state called it so — Mr. Mon- 
roe addressed a letter to the President, Mr. Madison, 
on the same subject, in which he says, '^ That the 
subject of impressments was placed by tliat note of 
the British commissioners, on ground both honour a- 
ble and advantageous to tlie United States. Tliat the 
term ^'^high seas" vi as omitted intentionally and with 
the view that impressments should be confined to the 
land^^ — that is to the British territory. He said "he 
did not mean to say that Great-Britain would ahan- 
don the practice on the high seas altogether^ but that 
she Avould abandon lier former practice, and only ex- 
ercise it in an extreme case, such as the desertion of 
a crew in a foreign and neutral country." 

J\*ow ice ask most sigmjicantly, for wliat we arc at 
war ? For a principle whicli Great-Britain lias de- 
clared she never will yield absolutely, but which she, 
has offered to modify, and check, and guard, and re- 
strain, in such a manner as to two of our present 
cabinet appeared perfectly '^ honourable and advan- 
tageous to us." 

We are tlicn figliting for a principle, an abstract 
claim, AvhicJi lias been in every '• honourable and ad- 
vantageous" light yielded by our enemy. 

As soon as our cabinet found that Great-Britain 
never would yield the jjyincij/Ie^ but that she would 
make such an arrangement as would be " honourable 
and advantageous,^^ they determined to adhere to, and 
insist on the abstract principle, and to yield the "hon- 
our and advantage." 

Perish the seamen — perish commerce ! but let us 
adhere to barren and useless rights — This was what. 
I Avas to shew lastly. Accordingly, on the 3d of 
1^'ebruary, 1807? when our cabinet found Great-Brit- 



1 



71 

fiin was ready to yield every tliiug but tlte principle 
— that iiW just cause of comjdaiut would be removed, 
they determined to defeat the arrangement, and or- 
dered our ministers to insist on the mere right and to 
propose, as Mr. jlussell lias lately proposed, '^ that 
the British government slioiiid relinquish her riglit oit 
our stipulating that we would not employ any Brit- 
ish seamen, not being a citizen, that is, not natural- 
ized, or unless he has been in our employ tico years.''* 

Here ended all hopes of accommodation ; and our 
government well know that they may safely offer the 
exclusion of British seamen, so long as they claim 
the right to protect all Avho are now in our country, 
and demand of her the admission that her native horn 
subjects shall be protected under our flag in merchant 
vessels on a common jurisdiction, the high seas. The 
l^reat point we have in view is now proved, That at 
no period has Great-Britain been willing to yield the 
right, though slie has made ^^ honourable and advan- 
tageous" oilers for a modification of its exercise. 

We cannot conclude tliis essay witliout quoting 
the following sentiments of Mr. Monroe on the sub- 
ject of the Britisli ofters about impressments, and tlie 
lolly of icar on that account. They ought to be 
written in letters of gold, and those letters in capitals. 

"^ The British could not recede from the ground 
they had taken, or accept, by compulsion, terras 
which they had rejected in an amicable negotiation. 
War, therefore, seemed to be the inevitable conse- 
quence of such a state of tilings ; and I was far from 
considering it an alternative to be preferred to the 
encouragement ojf'ered to us. When 1 took into view 
our prosperous and happy condition, and tliat our 
commerce flourished beyond example, notwithstand- 
ing the losses which it occasionally sustained, I wa» 
strongly of opinion that those blessings ought not to 
be hazarded in such a question j^^ I knew '* that the 
United States were not prepared for w ar — their coast 
ivrvsunfortiried — their cities defenceless — their militiii 



7S^ 

in many states neither armed nor trained — and their 
whole revenue derived from commerce — I coukl not 
jpresume there was just cause to doubt which of the 
alternatives ought to be preferred.'' 

In these opinions Mr. Monroe is joined by above 
sixty thousand people in Massachusetts, according to 
the late elections, and probably some millions in the 
United States ; yet the war is now carried on by an 
administration of which he is one, for the very prin 
ciple which he formerly declared was not worth it. 



NO. xni. 

MR. MADISO>f'S STRICTURES OX THE CONDUCT OF GU\, 
STRONG. 

Are the militia under the absolute control of the 
President of the United States ? 

Are they bound to fulfil all the duties of standing 
armies ? 

Does a mere declaration of war place the militia 
under the power of the President ? 

Is there no constitutional right in the executive, 
judiciary, and people of the several states to judge 
whether the militia are or are not constitutionally call- 
ed into service? 

Can they be continued in service at the pleasure 
of the national government, and ordered out of the 
United States? 

These questions are the most interesting which 
could possibly occur in our new republick. The Pres- 
ident has dared to call the opinion of Gov. Strong, 
supported as it is by our own state judiciary, " a novel 
and extraordinary one." 

That it is a " novel" one is true, because Mr. Mad- 
ison is the first President who has ventured to give 
an alarming and dangerous construction to tlie pow 
ers of the constitution. 



If Jiis construction be right, we never need talk m 
future of the consolidation of the states — Tlie state 
sovereignties are extinct. We have one vast military 
consolidation ; and the only remedy and bulwark, 
which the constitution provided against the usurpa- 
tion of an ambitious and unprincipled President, is 
gone. The state governments have nothing left to 
tliem to resist any and every species of usurpation. 

Compared to this, all our foreign disputes dwindle 
into insignificance. If this doctrine, advanced by 
Mr. Madison ; if this bold assumption and usurpa- 
tion be submitted to, it is, in our estimation, of no 
moment whether we are conquered by Great-Britain 
or France ; v» e shall fall a prey to our own domestick 
usurpers, who will be as hard task-masters as a for- 
eign potentate could possibly be. 

That an attempt is seriously making to destroy the 
state sovereignties, and of course the union, we shall 
prove by two quotations from papers publislied under 
the influence and patronage of administration. 

In the National Intelligencer, Mr. Madison's pa- 
per, speaking of t]ie refusal of the New-York militia 
to march out of the United States, to wage an offen- 
sive war, it was observed, " that these wretches (the 
militia) dared to talk of the constitution, when their 
country was in danger." 

As if a ^uixotick expedition into a foreign country 
was a proof that the country was in danger — and as 
if it was also a crime in a citizen to shield himself, 
his blood and his life, his liberty and his family, un- 
der the sacred provisions of the constitution. 

It would seem, then, according to Mr. Madison's 
paper, that the constitution is to l)e no safeguard to 
tlie citizen when he most needs it, but that to invoke 
its aid and its principles makes a citizen ^'a wretch.^' 

The Aurora, another Madisoniau paper, carries its 
insolence still farther. — Speaking of the people of 
New-England, it says, 

10 



74 

4^ Can these infernal traitors expect to escape with 
impunity ? They have no foundation for such for- 
bearance, while they are daily 2;uilty of treason by 
adhering to our enemies. But we do not fear thera^ 
for they are a cowardly set of villains. Neither the 
Governor of Massachusetts or Connecticut darefghtJ^ 

Fellow-citizens, we do not quote these things to in- 
flame your minds, or to excite your rage, but to shew 
you that your adherence to the constitution, and to 
your rights, expose you to the insults, and scoffs, and 
contumely of your opponents. Not content with de- 
stroying your commerce, they seem ripe for the inva- 
sion of your most sacred rights. 

I should despise these rasli writings, if it were not 
that they are countenanced by the President's Mes- 
sage. 

It is, therefore, important for us to inquire whether 
Gov. Strong has acted imprudently — whether our 
own Judges have given a corrupt or Avicked opinion ? 
Whether the question is so clear on the side of Mr. 
Madison, as to justify him in denouncing Gov. Strong 
and Gov. Griswold ? 

This is a great and important question — and it 
ought to be treated witli correspondent and becoming 
seriousness and deliberation. 

Far be it from us to suppose, that we can add any 
weight to the opinions and arguments of such great 
and venerable names. But it should be remembered, 
that men in high and official stations cannot, without 
lessening their dignity, enter into the office of advo- 
cates. — They cannot urge those small considerations, 
and popular reasons and arguments, which have an 
essential bearing on the question. 

We shall, therefore, with the indulgence of the 
publick, say a few tilings on this question, under the 
following views of it : 

1st. How did Congress or the President acquire, 
from the several slates or from the jjeople, the right 
to order out the militia in an/j case ? 



75 

Sd. In what cases did the' people authorize Con- 
gress to call out the militia ? 

3d. Can they call them out in any other cases than 
those explicitly authorized by the constitution ? 

4th. In whom^ from the very nature of the limita- 
tion, reposes the right to judge whether the delegated 
power is or is not rightfully exercised — or, in other 
words, of judging whether the cases in which the 
militia may be called out, do or do not exist ? 

5th. Admitting, which we do not believe, that the 
right of jiidgiTig is in the national government ; have 
they exercised that judgment, in the present case, 
honestly and according to the fair construction of the 
constitution — in other words, do either of the cases, 
provided for by the constitution, now exist ? 

6th. Admitting, as before, though against our opin- 
ion, that Congress have the right of judging of the 
existence of the limited cases provided for in the con- 
stitution, in which tlie militia may be called out^ and 
supposing that they have grossly abused their trust, 
as we shall show under the fifth question, is there no 
remedy, or if any, is tliere any other or better one, 
tlian a firm opposition and refusal of the executives of 
the several independent states ? 

Lastly. We shall consider tlie mischievous and ru- 
inous effects which would follow from the doctrine 
set up by Mr. Madison — Its hostility to the freedom 
of the citizen, and the absurd and contradictory con- 
sequences which would flow from its admission. 

\Ve are aware, that we have taken broad ground ; 
but we ought not to be deterred, on that account, from 
probing to the bottom so interesting and important a 
qucsfion. 



76 



NO. XIV. 

THE OBLIGATION OP THE CITIZEN TO DO MILITAKY DUTY IN 
ALC WARS, A r THE PLEASURE OF THE PRESIDENT, OR THE 
CLAIM TO CONVERT THE MILITIA IN 10 A STANDKNG AR- 
MY, CONSIDERED. 

Firstly — We inquire, by what authority do the 
President oi' Congress assume the power to order out 
the militia in any case ? 

On the revolt of tlie American colonies from Great- 
Britain, the absolute sovereignty was transferred from 
the king and parliament to the ijeojple. Neitlier the 
state governments nor the national government possess 
any rights which have not been expressh/ delegated 
to them. As against the federal goveinment, this 
proposition (obvious enough in itself) is made indis- 
putable by the Xllth article of the first amendments 
to the constitution, in which " all powers, not ex- 
pressly given, are declared to be reserved to the states 
respectively, or to the people." 

The federal government cannot claim the power of 
ordering out the militia as successors to the old con- 
federation, for the old confederation possessed no such 
powers. — They could do nothing with the militia, nor 
could they even raise troops, without the intervention 
of the several states. We went through one war suc- 
cessfully, with tlie whole power of the militia resting 
in the states. 

The federal government cannot claim this power, 
as being necessarily incident to any other power given 
to them, such as the power and duty of providing for 
the common defence^ because, first, there arc other 
and ample means given to them for this purpose, such 
as the powers of laying taxes, and of raising and 
maintaining armies and navies ; — it cannot be called, 
therefore, a necessary incident. 



77 

i5ut, secondly, no mle of fair construction v.ill per- 
mit a limited so vereipi to claim, by way oi incidental 
and implied jJoicers, tlie extension of any powers or 
authority which are the subject of express provision 
in the instrument deiining the authority to be delegat- 
ed. A grant of a limited j^oicer over a particular 
subject, excludes any furtlier constructive or inci- 
dental power over the same subject, as effectually as 
any words of negation or prohibition could possibly 
do. Thus, for example, if the constitution had pro- 
vided, that, " Congress shall have power to raise and 
maintain a standing army of ten thousand men, or to 
levy taxes to the amount of two millions of dollars,'' 
they would be as much restrained from raising more, 
as if there had been an express negative^ or prohib^ 
itory words in the constitution. They could not have 
raised more men or money, witliout the assent of thd 
several states^ let the emergency have been ever so 
great, or even if it had been absolutehj necessary to 
carry into effect their undoubted powers. They 
must apply to the states or people for further author- 
ity or aid. To suppose the contrary of these propo- 
sitions, would be to maintain that the delegate may 
be above his constituent — the creature above his crea- 
tor. It w ould go to the destruction of all limited 
written constitutions. It would be better to give to 
the constituted authorities general powers in all cases 
whatever, and trust to the rebellion or insurrection of 
the people, for a remedy in case of violent abuse. If 
these doctrines are, as we believe, indisputable. Con- 
gress derives all its power to call upon the militia ia 
any case, wholly from the constitution, and that con- 
stitution having given them that power only in three 
specified cases, they are restrained as much as they 
would have been by prohibitory words, from ordering 
Ihem out in any other cases. 

Secondly — i Avould ask, hi what cases did the peo- 
jde authorize Congress to call out the militia ? 



78 

The whole power given upon this subject, is con- 
iained in the following short sentence, clear, strong, 
and well defined : 

Congress shall have power " to provide for calling 
forth the militia, to execute the laws of the union, 
suppress insurrections, and rejpel invasions.''^ 

Tiiey can call them out in no other cases whatso- 
ever ; and if they should exercise tlie power in any 
other cases, it would be like any other illegal assump- 
tion of power, void — and the remedy would be th& 
same as if they were io separate a state without its 
consent — pass a hill of attainder against the citizens 
of a particular state, or exercise any other powers 
which are expressly 'prohibited to them 'hy the consiti- 
tution. 

I take it, throughout this argument, for granted, 
that there are no men base enough to contend, that 
Congress may, from the necessity of the case, the 
common plea of tyrants, exercise a power expressly 
prohibited to them ; yet from some recent instances I 
should be led to fear, that there may be some syco- 
phants, who even in sucli a case would preach up the 
duty of obedience to our own government^ and volun- 
teer their arms in defence of its avowed violation of 
our rights. 

Thirdly — Can Congress order out the militia in 
any other than the three cases pointed out in the 
Constitution ? 

Most assuredly not, according to the argument 
under the first question. — The argument ex absurdo 
can hardly ever be more strong. — Of what use was it 
to authorize Congress to order out the militia in three 
specified cases, if they would have the power to or- 
der them out in all cases, or at pleasure without that 
provision ? We repeat, tliat a specifick grant by one 
having authority, to one who before had yione, is tan-^ 
tamount to a limitation to the exact extent of th6 
grant. 

But we come to the most important question, 



79 

• FoiirtJdy. Ill whom, from the very nature of the 
limitation, reposes tlie ultimate rii^lit to judge whether 
either of the three cases provided for by the consti- 
tution does exist ? 

We answer, generally, in the constituent, not tlie 
delegate ; in the master, not the servant — ultimately 
in the people, princijjally from the necessity of the 
case in tlie commanders in chief of the militia of the 
several states. 

The very idea of limitation excludes the possibility 
that the delegate should be the judge-— if he were, his 
powers would be limited only by his own judgment, 
or in other words, liis own arbitrary will, which is 
no limitation at all. 

In most cases,- tlie Judiciary of the United States 
are the ultimate judges of the constitution, and wheth- 
er its powers are fairly pursued. — But in this case 
the remedy would be inadequate. — During aa appeal 
to the Supreme Court, which sits but twice a year, 
and which might consume many months in delibera- 
tion, an invasion might lay waste the country, and be 
fatal to our liberties — or a rash President might seize 
the militia, send them on board sliips, to light on the 
borders of the Dwina, or on the sands of Africa — or, 
if a firm and dignified Governor should resist suck 
an usitrpatioiij a headstrong President, and obedient 
Congress might carry civil war, fire, and sword, into 
the state which dared to assert their constitutional 
rights. 

There can be therefore no umpire. — Either the 
delegate or the constituent must be the judge. To 
suppose that the delegate should be the judge would 
be to pervert tlie very first principles of common 
sense, prudence, freedom, and common laA^ . 

Of common sense, because of what use is a limitation, 
if the person you wish to restrain, can judge exclu- 
sively whether he breaks the limitation or not ? — Of 
priidence and freedom. i)ccause if you once permit 
the delegate to be the judge of his own powers, whal 



80 

security can you possibly have against the grossest 
abuses ? — At common law too, unless where the au- 
thority is coupled with ail interest, the power of the 
eonstituent is always superior to that of the attorney^ 
or substitute. 

Besides, from the yevy form of proceeding, adopted 
in ordering out tlie militia, nform rendered necessa- 
ry by the provisions of the constitution, the riglit of 
judging seems to be necessarily placed in the Gov- 
ernors of tjie several states. The orders are issued 
to them — they must tlierefore decide, whether the or- 
ders are in due form, and whether they are issued in a 
case which authorizes Congress to order out the mili- 
tia. — In ordinary military cases, the subordinate offi- 
cer is justified by the orders of his superior officer, 
whetlier those orders are right or wrong. But tlie 
Governors of the several states are not subordinate to 
the President, until after they are actually in the 
service of the United States. For ordering out the 
militia, which is an act which precedes the actual 
service, the Governors are responsible to their constit- 
uents, and may, and ought to be impeached if they 
do it, at the request of tlie President, in any case, not 
jjrovidedfor hij the constitution. 

Now a man cannot be liable to pmiishment for do^ 
ing that of which he was not the free judge, to de- 
cide whether he would, or would not do it. 

I have said that ihoform required hj the Constitu- 
tion made it vecessari/ that the Governors should 
judge whether the militia are rightfully ordered out. 
— I add, further, that it is not in the power of Con- 
gress to dispense with that form. — They cannot au- 
thorize the President to skip over the Governor, and 
order out the militia, directly, or to issue his orders 
to inferior officers — because, the President is not 
vested with the command of tlie militia, by the Cox- 
STiTUTiON, " until they are called into actual ser- 
vice'' — and they are not in actual service, until after 
tliey have been notified and ordered out. The mili- 



81 

tla Major-Generals can recognize no order^ but that 
of the Commander in Chief of the state ; nor can any 
Brigadier-Generals recognize any order, but tliat of 
their superiors in tlie militia, until after they have 
been ordered out, and are in actual service. Any 
order, therefore, from the President, would be of no 
more validity, nor any more justification to an inferior 
militia officer, for ordermg out the militia, than a 
similar order from George, Prince of WaleSp Re- 
gent, &^'c. 

It is' not in the povi^er of Congress to mend this 
matter. It can only be effected by an alteration of 
the constitution. We know the President and his 
satellites argue from the possible abuse of this power, 
])y the Governors of the several states against the 
right. " We arc not one state, ^^ says the President, 
if this ^^ novel" doctrine be true. It is not a ^' novel" 
doctrine that we are not one state — It is a " novel" 
doctrine that we are so. It is an insolent and open 
attempt at military consolidation. — We shall say 
more on the subject of abuse of this power hereafter. 



NO. XV. 



i HE spmrr displayp^d by the presideIsit and war de- 
partment IN i'heir construciign of the coNSTrru- 

TION, AND their REPRESENTATION OF THE DANGER OF 
INVASION. 

Fifthly. — Admitting, which we deny, and have 
disproved, that the right of judging, when the eases 
occur, in which the militia may be ordered out, rests 
definitively with the President and Congress ; have 
they in the late orders to the Governors of Massa- 
chusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode- Island, lionestly 
executed the trust, in the fair spirit of the constitu- 
tion — or in other words, do either of the three cases 
exist ? 

As it is not pretended by the President; that the 

a 



(roops are ordered out, in consequence of the exist- 
ence of the two first cases ; as it is well known^ 
that the laws are not forcibly resisted, nor has auy 
insurrection taken place, the only remaining ques- 
tion is. Has there been at auy period or does there 
now exist an inversion to be I'ejjelled ? 

It would be the duty of a man addressing a society 
of Hottentots, or difree Negroes, to beg their par- 
dons, for paying so poor a compliment to their un- 
derstandings, as to discuss this questiou seriously : 
but since the President, who ouglit to know the char- 
acter, and talents of his constituents better than w^e 
do, has ventured to insult their understandings, by 
pretending, that this case of invasion, or imminent 
danger thereof, has existed, in the true spirit of the 
constitution, we trust, we may be excused, for argu- 
ing a question, which every school -boy, and every 
timid girl, on either of the most exposed frontiers^ 
would laugh at and ridicule. 

The words of the constitution, have a wonderful 
legal precision, which one would have supposed, 
would have precluded even a Jesuit from cavilling : 
— " Congress shall have power to provide for cal- 
'' ling out the militia to repel invasion^ 

The invasion must actually exist, and the militia, 
can only be kept in service, so long as is necessary 
to REPEL it. The moment it is rebelled, the Com- 
manders in Chief of each state, have a right instantly 
to recall them. It seems as if there was, (and there 
most undoubtedly was) an uncommon jVaZows^, as to 
the power of the federal government, over this natu- 
ral, j'.nd only constitutional bulwark, of the several 
states, and of the people. 

Lest the militia should be ordered out, jivemature- 
hj, or in case of wnr, gew rally, it was provided, that 
they should only be called out during foreign wars, 
in case of '^ invasion^^ — and lest, when once in the 
service of the United States, they should be contin- 



83 

ued during the Avar, ov longer tlian the great, and 
sudden exigency required, it was provided, that they 
should only be obliged to •• repel'^ invasion. 

The moment the invader was repulsed, the militia 
had performed all that the constitutiou required of 
them, and might, and ou_^ht, to be recalled ]>y the 
Governors of the several states — otlierwise, these 
restrictive words have no meaning, and the consti- 
tution, might as well have given the whole command 
to the United States, without any limitation. 

If, therefore, Gov. Strong, had trusted to Mr. 
Madison's word, (a trust, which since his procla- 
mation about the repeal of the Berlin decrees, we 
confess, would be an extraordinary one,) and had 
ordered out the militia, it would have been his duty, 
as soon as he found, that the danger, liad so far van- 
ished, that the commander in chief of the United 
States army, and all the regular troops, had remov- 
ed from the maritime frontieis, and had actually en- 
tered, or were threatening, the territories of Great 
Britain, instantly to have recalled the drafted mili- 
tia of Massachusetts. As the guardian of the rights 
of the people of this state, he is bound to see that 
their lives, their fortunes, and their rights, are not 
exposed to greater dangers, than the constitution 
requires. 

As soon, tlierefore, as all appearance of invasion 
was at an end fifffiere ever ivas any, J he ought to 
have recalled tlie militia. 

We are aware, that the Congress of 1795, did give 
a liberal construction to the constitution, and did 
authorize the President, to order out the militia in 
case of '* imminent danger of invasion.^^ 

If this means any thing more, than the actual ad- 
vance of a competent military force of the enemy, to- 
wards our maritime, or internal frontiers, with appa- 
rent intent, to invade them, tlie Congress of 1795, 
were mistaken, and assumed a power, which docs 
not belong to the National Government. 



84 

But even this argument, will not avail Mr. Madi- 
son ; for grant that the Congress of 1795, were right, 
and that the words of the constitution, were *" im- 
minent danger ofinvasion,'' still it is notorious, that 
no such danger has existed. 

What part of the United States, has been threat- 
ened with, or in imminent danger of invasion ? 
shall we disgrace our navy, by admitting, that our 
ten ships of war, which were, during the jmst sum- 
mer, superior to the British force on this coast, w ere 
unable to repel, predatory incursions ? was there 
any danger, that the commanders of British ships, 
uninstructed, as they must have been, by their own 
government, which was ignorant of the war, would 
make a predatory descent, on the shores of the U~ 
nited States ? besides, were these accidental, tem- 
porary, predatory excursions, the '^^ invasion" con- 
templated by the constitution, which the arm of the 
national government, and its fortresses would be in- 
competent, to ^' repel ?" could it be supposed, that 
the framers of the constitution intended, that the 
President, should order out the militia, andkeep them 
embodied, during the whole of a maritime war, 
through fear of a temporary, occasional descent, by 
a privateer or a frigate? are not the Zoca/ militia, 
while at home, amply competent, to repel small en- 
terprizes ? if not, we make a grand parade about 
our militia, to no purpose, and worse than to 
no purpose. But this is not so. The militia, cal- 
led together, without any previous notice, drove be- 
fore them Earl Percy, witli 3000 veterans ; and the 
militia, unembodied until the moment a ileet should 
appear in our offing, would, in twenty four liours^ 
repel any British force, which could imssihhj come 
here, without having previous information. 

Was there, then, any serious danger in June 
last, or has there been since, of an '' invasion*' by 
sea, from Great Britian ? did the President, ajrpre- 



85 

liend any ? if he did, he betrayed the country, by 
sending away the troops, from the place where ho 
did except " invasion" to another place, where he 
did not fear it, but where he meant to make an inva- 
sion on an inferior enemy. 

Could it be feared, that Britain would invade us, 
before she kneio of the war ? could it be feared, that 
she would do it, after she heard of it, and when we. 
found her, liberating, and sending away all Ameri- 
can ships, and an immense amount of American 
property, under the hopes of peace, to be produced 
by the repeal of the orders in council ? is an ^' inva- 
sion" feared, even now, by any one man in the Uni- 
ted States ? NO — it is a groundless, insulting pre- 
tence. Great-Britain, occupied in Spain, and in the 
Balticlv,and pressed, unexpectedly and cruelly, pres- 
sed, by the tools of France in this country, will 
scarcely be able to defend her colonies, from butche- 
ry, and plunder and conquest. This was the calcu- 
lation upon which the war was undertaken. It was 
a repetition of the old fable ol the sick lion. Nev- 
er would the war have been undertaken^ if any real 
danger of ^' invasion" had existed. 

If then, no danger of " invasion" existed by sea, 
will it be pretended, that we were in danger of "in- 
vasion" by land ? where is the brazen faced, party 
politician, who will advance such a pretence ? will 
the partizans of Mr. Madison tell us this, when they 
have so often promised us, the barren provinces of 
two Canadas. as a compensation for the loss of our 
commerce, our blood, and our treasure ? will those 
men, who proposed and discussed a bill, fortlic occu- 
pation, and annexation, of the two Canadas, to the 
United States, pretend, that these provinces will in- 
vade us? will those members of Congress, Porter, 
Williams, Cheeves and Widgery, who liave prom- 
ised us the immediate possession of these 'provinces, 
tell us we are in danger from them ? 



86 

But above all, Mr. Madison is precluded from 
the apology, because he has sent three distinct arm- 
ies to invade Canada — and we have a right to pre- 
sume he authorized their commanders to issue the 
proclamations which they have done, in which they 
speak with contempt of the enemy's force and pow- 
er, and of the ease with which the conquest can be 
effected, a language very disgraceful to our nation, 
if the prospect of success had not been nearly cer- 
tain. Besides, Mr. Madison by refusing Sir 
GreorgePrevost's proposition for an armistice, prov- 
ed he had no fears of an invasion. 

Mr. Madison it appears, then, could not have 
feared an invasion by sea, because Great-Britatu 
had no Tcnoivledge of the war — because she liberat- 
ed American property — repealed her Orders in 
Council, and was making a new embassy for peace. 
It appears, slso, that he had no fears for the sea 
board, for he ordered away all the troops for the in- 
vasion of Canada. It is equally clear that he did 
not fear an invasion by land, because he was both 
making and preparing an invasion of Canada, and 
he kncAV Great-Britain had not a force even com- 
petent for defence. 

Yet, in face of the clear sense and spirit of the 
constitution, he ordered out the militia. This we 
call an usurpation ; but the manner of doing it wc 
consider a pettifogging quibble. In tlie first appli- 
cation to all the eastern Governors, it was not stated 
that there was an " invasion" to be repelled, or an 
imminent danger of one, but when the Governors 
hesitated on this ground, they were artfully told, 
that the danger of invasion had increased since his 
first demand — but as there was no danger at firsts 
it still did not follow tliat there was much at the 
last application. In fact, Mr. Madison knew 
there was none. The real design, we shall sho^v 
in our next. 



87 



NO. XVI. 
rilE QUESTION OF MILITARY CONSCRIPTION, CONCLUDED. 

We have shewn, that the right of judging whether 
the cases in which the militia can be ordered out, 
exist, is vested, from the very nature of the limitation, 
in the Grovernors of the several states ; and we have 
proved, that even if this right existed in the Presi- 
dent, it has been, in the late cases, very unjustly ex- 
ercised. We shall now say something more on this 
subject, before we consider the remedy for such an 
abuse, and the evil consequences which may follow 
from this abuse, if not duly restrained. 

When the Secretary at War, and the President^ 
were very properly pushed by tlie Executives of the 
northern states, to state, precisely, the nature and ex- 
tent of the danger of invasion^ they replied, that war 
having been commenced, there resulted from the very 
fact of war, a danger of invasion. If any other evi- 
dence of such danger existed, it would have been 
easy to state it — indeed it would have been obvious 
to the whole nation. 

But knowing that no such danger existed, they pre- 
ferred to rest their claim on the simple existence of 
war, a war declared by the United States themselves. 
We shall not enter into the question, in this place, of 
the justice of the war, nor of its being an oifcnsive, 
not a defensive, one. We simply ask the good peo- 
ple of this state, whether the mere existence of a war 
is a sufficient ground to autliorize the President to 
call out the militia ! According to tJiis monstrous and 
novel construction, the constitution sliould be read, 
tliat, ^' Congress should have power to call out the 
militia to execute the law, repress insurrections, and 
in any ivara in ivhich the Unitpd States may he en- 
i^aged.-' 



88 

If the framers of the coustitutiou hiteiided this, they 
adopted the strangest expressions in their povv er. — 
Nations may be engaged in wars of ambition — of 
foreign conquest ; they may carry their arms to the 
remotest quarters of the globe. If it was tlieir inten- 
tion, that whether invasion was or was not threaten- 
ed, but merely because, in all wars, invasion might 
be possible, the President should have an unlimited 
power over the militia, they certainly expressed them- 
selves very awkwardly, when they authorized Con- 
gress to order out the militia, to " repel invasions.'' 

According to the new doctrine, a war declared against 
Teeuraseh or the Dey of Algiers would give the 
President a control over the whole militia — and this 
not only during the existence of the danger of inva- 
sion, ])ut during the whole war. For, according to 
the reasoning of the secretary of war, so long as the 
war lasts, there is, from the nature of umr itself, a 
possibility of invasion — and the President being the 
sole judge of this danger, tlie militia may be kept in 
service during the war. Words or argumeuts can- 
not make this point clearer. If to " repel invasion^- 
means the danger of possible invasion when there is 
no probability of it, and if the President is the ex- 
clusive judge upon this point, then the limited pow- 
ers of the constitution are of no avail, and the Pres- 
dent is the absolute commander of every man in the 
United States, and may keep him in service so long 
as he chooses to have a war on foot with any nation, 
from the meanest tribe of savages to the conqueror of 
Europe. 

We now enquire, sixthhh whether if the absurd 
doctrine should be maintained, tliat in case o{ re- 
stricted powers, the delegate shall be the exclusive 
judge of the extent of his powers, and if Congress 
may decide, whetber tlie cases provided for by the 
constitution do or do not exist, still if the people 
should be satisfied that they surpass their authority, and 
abuse their trust, there is any better remedy than for 



89 

tlie Executives of the several states to refuse to ordei 
out the militia ? 

There isoiie other remedy, and that is, for the in- 
dividual soldier to resist — and if attempted to be for- 
ced into service, contrary to the constitution, to kill 
his assailant, or to collect his friends to rescue liim. 

Every man will admit that tliis remedy is a dread- 
ful one ; and yet it must be granted that the militia, not 
being voluntary soldiers, ought not to be forced into 
service, to be compelled to cliange tlieir habits and 
become mercenary soldiers, during a whole war, as 
may be the case, without amj remedy. 

Even if the President, therefore, is the exclusive 
judge, which we deny, still in case of a gross abuse 
of his power, such as in the present instance in de- 
claring that the United States is in dariger of inva- 
sion, when every man knows and feels that they are 
not ; we see no better, more quiet, or constitutional 
remedy than for tlieir superior and immediate com- 
manding officer to refuse. 

He takes, to be sure, a solemn responsibility upon 
himself; — but if he acts honestly, and prudently, 
and coolly, he ought to meet with the support and 
confidence of those whom it is his duty to protect. 

Our most excellent Magistrate has taken this 
course — and he has availed himself of the admirable 
provision of our constitution, by requiring the opin- 
ion of the judges of our own supreme court, which, 
so far as respects all citizens of Massachusetts, must 
be considered as the law. 

Indeed, what man of common sense ^^ ill dare to 
say, that actual invasion ha.s existed, or that great 
and imminent danger of it which would authorise the 
Governor, to tear the hus])ands, fathers and sons of 
our industrious yeomanry from tlieir families, to sick- 
en, to bleed, and perish in the camps of an army wa- 
ging a war of ambition and conquest. 

We shall now state, in conclusion, some strong rea- 
sons why this demand upon the militia is unreasona- 



90 

Mpj tlangeTOiis to the liberty of the subject, and 
fraught with most destructive consequences to the 
rights and interests of the people. 

It is unreasonable, because Congress being invested 
with the whole revenue of the United States ; having 
power by direct and indirect taxes to take the last 
dollar from the pockets of the people — and liaving 
also the power of raising armies without limitation, and 
of maintaining them even in time of peace ; tliey 
ought not to declare war until they have provided the 
adequate meaus to carjvj it on. The case would be 
very different, and the feelings of the people of a dif^ 
ferent cast, if a foreign nation had waged war against 
us and had taken us, unawares. 

To subject the people in addition to the sacrifices 
and losses of war — to its burdens and taxes ; to quit 
their farms and their occupations, and to render per^ 
sonal service in camps, subject to martial law, and 
without their having any option in the business, is 
very unreasonable. 

Even if the w^ar was necessary, still we can see no 
reason why it could not have been postponed until the 
armies were raised who were to carry it on. 

We do indeed perceive, that if it had been delayed 
only six weeks, the great cause of it would have been 
removed, and probably Congress would not have 
been persuaded to declare it — we hope it was not 
hastened on that account, lest the repeal of the Brit- 
ish Orders in Council should prevent the adoption of 
so desperate a measure. 

The measure of ordering out tlie militia is danger- 
ous to our liberties — because it is an assumption of 
power not granted by the Constitution — because when 
they are amalgamated and consolidated with the mer- 
cenary troops, the people will have no means of de- 
fence left to them against the ambition of a corrupt 
President — because on the principle on which tliey 
are ordered out they may be kept in service dur- 
ing the whole of any and every war which the Pres- 



91 

wlent and a majority of Congress may see fit to de- 
clare. 

The militia, according to this doctrine, will be at 
any and all times subject to martial law, without hav- 
ing voluntarily enlisted. They will bear all the dis^ 
grace of defeats, and will enjoy none of the honours 
or rewards of victory. There is no provision for 
their support in case they are wounded ; and every 
disaster is charged to their want of discipline or cour- 
age. 

It is said the Governors may abuse this power of 
judging whether they will order out the militia. To 
this we have a short reply ;— We do not know why 
it should be presumed that the Governors will abuse 
this trust more than the President. If however, a 
feiv of them should do it, it could not produce much 
injury to the United States, because the latter ought 
rather to rely on their own forces than on the militia. 
If a major part of the Governors should refuse, it 
would be a conclusive proof that the war was not a 
proper one. But if the President should grossly a- 
buse his trust, the liberties of the people will be de- 
stroyed. 



NO. XVI r. 

11^ FAVOR OF A GEND'ARMIE NATION ALE, UNDER THE MILD 
TITLE OF A LOCAL VOLUNTEER FORCE. 

Quia plennmjueinopes, acvagi, sponte militiam siimunt. — tacitus. 

It is natural that men who for more than thirty years 
have been accustomed to regard the interests and 
wishes of France as considerations of great political 
weight — men who v,ere unwilling that even our in- 
dependence and fisheries should be secured without 
the consent of the French Court — men who have al- 
ways had the confidence and liave received the prais- 
es of the successive French ministers in our country 



9^ 

—men who have been honoured with the rank and 
privileges of French citizens, and decorated with the 
cordon of the Legion of Honour — men who have 
made a negotiation with France, restoring her to all 
her ancient privileges, ^vithout obtaining the reim- 
bursement of one dollar of the many millions placed 
in the Emperor's caise (P amortissement — men who 
declared the French decrees repealed on the 1st day 
of November, 1810, which the Emperor on the S8th 
of April last flatly contradicted — men, in fine, who 
have now entered into war on the side of France, for- 
mally against Great-Britain alone, but substantially a^ 
gainst Russia, Spain and Portugal. — It is natural that 
snch men should become attached to all the French 
modes q^ internal and external policy and arms. — It 
was not, therefore, with surprise, though we confess 
it was with some emotion, we saw tliem attempt the 
introduction of the conscription laws of France a- 
gaiust the plainest, most indisputable sense of the 
constitution. 

We have frequently called this attempt of the Pres- 
ident to coerce the militia, conscription — we will now 
explain why it is justly so called. The militia are 
enrolled against their own inclination — it is not a 
matter of choice, but necessity. They, however, were 
intended both in Great-Britain and this country only 
as a local defence, and not to supply the place of 
standing troops, especially for foreign conquest. — 
When, therefore. Congress draft 100,000 militia, they 
order them out without giving them an opinion — it is 
force, not inclination — it is necessity, not patriotism^, 
which obliges them to go. If this be done in a case 
where the militia arc not obliged by the constitution 
to serve, it is an attempt at usurpation — if carried into 
execution by force, it is tyranny. 

Tlie conscription laws of France are founded on 
(he same principle. — The militia are drafted as with 
US ; — the only difference is, that tlie draft is confined 
in France to the youtlis of nineteen years of age, a 



93 

system, which, by withdrawing all the youth before 
tliey are qualiiied for any profession, destroys their 
morals, defeats their prospects in future life, and par- 
alizes the industry of the nation. 

But even this demoralizing, debasing, corrupting, 
wicked example, is not without its charms in the 
eyes of the admirers and imitators of France in this 
country. It seems an army of recruiting oificers 
were attempted to be sent to entice, corrupt and kidnap 
our sons and apprentices — Measures were in contem- 
plation, though checked by the Senate, of a nature, 
of a severity which the people of Britain will not en- 
dure. Apprentices, cannot in that country be enlist- 
ed, and even in the sea service, the great buhcark of 
that nation, where if any thing would justify the 
breach of private rights, tlie importance of maintain- 
ing their maritime power would do it, apprentices 
cannot betaken during the first three years of ap- 
prenticeship, and during the remainder, the master is 
to receive their wages. But here^ freedom — eman- 
cipation — icages were intended to be oifered as the 
means of seduction to the sons of our farmers and the 
apprentices of our mechanicks. 

There is but one point in which the comparison 
between the French and American conscriptions does 
not hold. 

The conscripts are there collected by the gen d'ar. 
merie, chained, and sent to the depot, or rather driv- 
en as we drive cattle. 

In this country we have, as yet, been deficient in 
that part of the machinery of inteinal police, the 
gens d'armes, and the local volunteer force is pre- 
cisely to fill this gap. 

After this shall be complete, Congress Avill laugh — 
Mr. Madison, Dr. Eustis (he kno\A s ^^ ell tchy I men- 
tion him, J and Gen. Dearborn, will sneer at tlie re- 
fusal of the militia or opposition of the local Govern- 
ours. — JVext year, unless we defeat tlie project in- 
stantly, next year our militia will be drafted without 



94 

the consent of the Grovernoiirsj and will be inarched 
chained to the place of rendezvous. 

Do not let people startle at this prophecy, or con> 
sider it a bold, unwarrantable thing. It is not more 
against general opinion, than a prophecy we made 
two years ago, that we sliould adopt the Continental 
System, and enter into a icar on the side of France. 

The fall of Roman liberties, when Julius Caesar 
obtained the command of the armies of both Gauls, 
was not so probable as a civil war, and the destruction 
of our liberties from the organization of this Prsetorian 
band — -tliis gen dhirmerie in the midst of us — this lo- 
cal, pensioned corps, I care not whether you call 
them " Sicaires, Guards, Presidential Janizaries, or 
Local Volunteers.'' 

I shall say something about their resemblance to 
the gens d' amies, and about their unconstitutional, 
dangerous alarming character — and give a few hints 
as to the remedy, or barrier against this arbitrary 
stretch of power. 

Tlie gens d'armes of France amount to about 
100,000 men, in a population of 35 millions. 

The gens d'armes of Madison, the volunteers, a- 
mount to 50,000, in a population of 7 millions, so that 
the proportion, which our police spies and guards 
bear to the whole people, is more than twice as great 
as that of France. 

The French gens d'armes are sufficient to keep the 
people in a state of abject slavery — Our gens d'armes 
ought of course to be still more competent to the same 
object. 

The French gens d'armes are selected for their 
zeal and fidelity to the Emperor — Ours are selected 
in the same manner. It is only tlie most bitter, and 
violent, and ])erseciiting, and blind friends of admin- 
istration, who ofter themselves, or are accepted. 

The French gens d'armes are officered by the Em- 
peror — Our gens d'armes are officered by the Presi- 
dent. The Frencli gens d'armes are scattered through 



03 

the whole country ^ — are always ready to iuform — to 
check freedom of discussion — to execute the Emper- 
ors will. Our gens d'armes are in like manner dis- 
seminated through tlie whole country to watch — to 
check disaffection, and obey their chief. 

The French gend'arinerie seldom or never fight a 
publick enemy — they live in and near liome — lead an 
idle life, and draw great pay. Our volunteers, Mr. 
Madison recommendsj should not be obliged to leave 
home — If the enemy comes to their houses, perhaps 
they might fight^ but they are to l)c paid for living in 
idleness^ — paid for their loyalty — paid for tlieir votes 
— paid for watching the opposition — paid for cutting 
tlieir fellow-citizen's tliroats (if need should be) or if 
Madison sliould so order. 

Our constitution recognizes but two species of land 
forces, regular troops and militia. So long as Con- 
gress conlined themselves to raising regular troops 
by means of volunteer enlistments, they were perfect- 
ly right ; only it ought to be understood that the vol- 
unteers formerly ordered to be raised, are in all res- 
pects r eg alar s — and ought to be added to the stand- 
ing army. 

In this view. Congress authorized a standing army 
of eighty-jive thousand men, to wit, 35,000 to be en- 
listed, and 50,000 to be accepted as volunteers. Bui 
as tlie latter liave the same pay, are officered by the 
President, and are subject to martial law, to be shot 
for desertion or cowardice, I can see no difference be- 
tween them and regulars. 

For the same reason that men would not enlist^ to 
wit, that they hate tlie war, and despise the degrada- 
tion of common soldiers^ a sentiment which we pray 
to God, our yeomanry may always feel, they woiild 
not volunteer. 

What then is the scheme proposed? That volun- 
teers may be raised, officered by the President, draw 
pay, and stay at home. An imperiiim in imperio 



with a witness ! A mongrel breed of soldier citizens 
and citizen soldiers. " 

Can Congress raise troops upon sncli a condition ? 
Pay them for not tighting ? 

We not only think this attempt dangerous to the 
citizen, but we think it subversive of the constitution. 
Congress may raise as many troops as they please, 
but it must be to form an army. 

The mode proposed is only an insidious way of 
destroying the militia, or of getting the power of offi- 
cering it, and commanding it from the several 
states, and vesting it in the President. 

If Congress can accept 50,000, they can 500,000 
volunteers. They are not bound to take even the 
50,000, in due proportions, in the several states — 
they may accept them all in one state — they may ac- 
cept 50,000 volunteers in Massachusetts. Where 
then would be Gov. Strong's command of the militia ? 
Wiiere that of our Major- Generals ? — We do not 
object to Congress accepting the services of any men 
who will go forth to fight, and endure the dangers of 
the field. But Ave do deny its right to defeat the in- 
tent of the constitution, by transferring the icJiole mi- 
iitia to the President — by bribing men to remain at 
home, and prove disloyal to their own state govern- 
ments. 

My remedy would be, tliat the militia higlier offi - 
cers sliould insist on these volunteers doing militia 
duty — that the legislature should punish any officers, 
who shall seduce any militia from their ranks and 
duty — and also we advise a vigilant, jealous, and 
vigorous attention to arms, in the militia, who are not 
Qorrujpted, 



97 



NO. XVIIT. 
RECAPITUI.ATION AND CONCLUSION. 

We have now finislied the i^emarks which we in- 
leaded to make on the Message of the President — 
ivith what fidelity and success this has been done, the 
the PUBLICK must decide. We are aware, that in exe^ 
outing this task, much time has been consumed, and 
that the great and interesting topicks which that Mes- 
sage presented, have required more developement than 
it will be in the power of most readers to follow, Avith 
that undivided attention which their importance de- 
mands. Indeed we have a right to remark, that it is im- 
possible, in a discussion divided and separated as it 
must be in the essays suited to our weekly journals, that 
any man can follow the chain of reasoning, and trace 
all the connections of it, without some general sum- 
mary, Avhich shall embrace and display the whole in 
a compact and simple forui. This is the object of our 
present and last essay. 

Our first object was to shew, tliat the apparent of^ 
fers of peace antl negotiation, on tlie part of our cab- 
inet, were perfectly illusory ; that they had no other 
foundation or design, than to quiet the fears of our 
citizens — to check the exertions of the friends of 
peace — to secure the election of Mr. Madison, and 
so to paralize the exertions of the British ministry, as 
10 prevent their taking any effectual measures to de- 
fend Canada, Avhich it was hoped, by this artifice, 
would have been conquered before this time. 

It was shown, from ample quotations, and, as we 
believe, arguments unansweral)le, that such terms 
were proposed, as it was well known, from former 
negotiations, Great-Ijiitahi would necessarily reject 5 
that even as a condition of sl suspension of hostilities, 
preparatory to a negotiation, it was required, that 

13 



98 

Great-Britain should^ ])y an informal but clear and 
indisputable understanding, bind herself to yield the 
only question in dispute, a question from which Mr. 
Monroe declared she could not recede, especially 
from compulsion, Avhen she had refused to recede 
from it by amicable negotiation. 

We have shown, that through all the subsequent 
instructions of our cabinet, this point was pertina- 
ciously adhered to, and that even in the last letter to 
Sir John Borlaise Warren, it was repeated that hos- 
tilities would not cease until Great-Britain should 
agree, as a preliminary, to yield this most essential 
point of the whole controversy. We neglected, how- 
ever, in our argument, to notice, one most conclusive 
proof of the insincerity of our cabinet, and of their 
belief that the offers they had made to Great-Britain, 
would be rejected. It shews a persuasion apriori, 
which goes to the absolute conviction of their insin- 
cerity. We allude to the refusal of the offers of Sir 
George Prevost, to agree to an armistice, a suspension 
of tiie shedding each others blood. These offers 
were made before any answer was received, as to the 
propositions sent to Great-Britain. They were pre- 
dicated on the repeal of the Orders in Council, and 
■no cause of tear remained, but the subject of impress- 
ments. If our government had been sincere in tlieir 
propositions through Mr. Russell, and if they had 
thought they were such as Great-Britain could or 
might accept — in the name of humanity — of honour 
— of fair and honourable dealing, Avliy not agree to a 
suspension of the horrors of war, until the answer 
could be received ? 

It must have been, because they expected the re- 
fusal, and they were afraid they should lose the "^un- 
gathered" laurels of the Generals Hull, and Smyth, 
and Dearborn. 

We have shewn, that the only equivalent offered 
to Great Britain, was the excluskni o^ British seamen 
from our vessels in future ; but w hat should consti- 



99 

tute ¥i British seaman — whether a residence of on© 
(lay, or of two years, in the United States, together 
witii the inysterioLis operation of an act of Congress, 
and an oatli before a county court, should transform 
a Scotch or Irish sailor into a genuine American — 
whether a bill of Mr. Wright, or Mr. Williams, should 
sever the inseparable allegiance whicli every man 
owes to his native country — whether any and what 
provisions sliould be made against a fraudulent abuse 
of naturalization, (not by our government, for that 
could not be presumed) but by the seamen, — were 
points which were left wholly untouched in the in- 
structions and oifers. 

Nay, to render these vague proposals, if possible, 
>i\\\ more untangible, Great-Britain was assured, that 
by our constitution, the President could make no 
stipulations for Congress. 

If any one would be desirous of knowing what 
would prol)a])ly be the temper of Congress on this 
subject, let him take with him the two following an- 
ecdotes, founded on indisputable facts : — Mr. Dana, 
of Connecticut, has, for tliree or four years past, pro- 
posed and brought in l>ills to require, that the mer- 
chant vessels of the United States should be navigat- 
ed, in certain proportions, say tlu'ee-fourths, by na- 
tive seamen ; and his attempts have been abortive. 
Last winter, a committee of the House, consisting of 
Messrs. Wright, and Pitkin, and Tallnuin, were ap- 
pointed on this subject. The two latter having given 
an opinion in favour of excluding British sailors from 
our ships, Mr. Wright, who was opposed to it, being 
iiie chairman, never called the committee together af- 
terwards, in order to defeat, as it was supposed, the 
project. 

in fine, it may be asked, if any serious intention 
had existed to make this offer tiie foundation of a 
peace, why did not the President, who knew his own 
incompetency to make any stipulation Avithoutthe con- 
sent of both Houses, recommended to them to pass a 



100 

iaw, ill June last, conformable to the offers lie Was 
about to make ? He had a precedent in the law rela- 
tive to the repeal of tiic Orders in Council, and if he 
had gone forward to Great-Britain With a speeifick 
and authorized proposition, guaranteeing her against 
the future loss of her seamen, tliere would have been 
at least the appearance of sincerity. 

We then entered at large into the merits of this 
question, so much the subject of complaint, and so 
little understood. We shewed that Great-Britain 
disclaims the pretence of taking American seamen^ 
and only claims the right to take Jier oicn subjects 
out of merchant ships, on the high seas, and in her 
own ports. 

We adduced the most abundant autliorities to shew, 
that by tlie consent of all nations, allegiance is per- 
petual — that it is not weakened or affected by time, 
place, or swearing allegiance to another power. That 
these are the fundamental principles of the common 
law of England, have been maintained by lier courts 
and jurists from the earliest times, and of course, al- 
though she naturalizes the subjects of otlier states, 
she does not claim the right to absolve them, or to 
protect them against their own natural sovereign. 

We shewed, also, that the same doctrine had been 
maintained in ous own country, in the case of one 
Williams, tried for enterins; into tlie service of France, 
even when we were at pc-'uce- — to wliicli we now add 
the cases of Jonatlian Nutting, and one George Bat- 
terman, convicted in this town, in the year 1794, for 
the same offence. 

We then proved, that this practice of Great-Britain 
has been exercised by her ever since the year 1640, 
against all nations, and without complaint. We cit- 
ed, also, a succession of French ordinances, from 
1654 to the present War, shewing tliat France main- 
tains the same claims over her own seamen, and exe- 
cutes them with more rigour — We now add to the 
cases before cited, another ordinance of France, Avhicli 



101 

i-equires every armed cruiser to be fiirnislied with au 
able lin£^uist or iuterjjretery and directs that, without 
regard to passports or protections, lie shall examine 
^11 the crews of merchant ships, which they may meet 
w ith on the high seas, in order that he may observe 
whether they speak tlic language of the country to 
which they pretend to belong, correctly. 

Tlius making the ear of a foreign linguist the court 
to decide the citizenship of a neutral creiv. What 
becomes of Mr. Madison's sad complaint of the cruel- 
ty of erecting a midshipman into a judge ? 

We then entered into the impolicy of our waging 
war, for the privilege of employing British sailors. 
We said tliat it was contrary to tlie policy of all en- 
lightened states, to give so much encouragement to 
foreign sailors, to the prejudice of their own ; that 
that our naval power — ^our commerce — -the superior 
protection wliieh our own seamen would experience, 
by our abandoning this practice of covering foreign 
sailors, all invited us, honestly and Mrly, to exclude 
them altogether. 

We remarked, that Great-Britain was peculiarly 
situated. Her marine power was her only security 
against the horrible scenes which have been recently 
acted at Moscow. That the similarity of language 
afforded facilities, the higher rate of wages tempta- 
tions to her seamen to enter our service, and that al- 
though at present her loss had not exceeded 20,000 
or 30,000 men, yet if our merchant ships should be- 
come a perfect asylum to her seamen, the mutiny at 
the J\'*ore would be a tritlc to the danger she would 
run ; — That the knowledge that they are liable to be 
impressed now restrains her seamen, and that alone. 

We added, that e\ (mi were it a neiv case in the law 
of nations, the extremity and importance of it would 
make her excusable, for insisting upon some remedy 
for such an abuse of our neutrality, growing out of 
our peculiar relative situation to her. We cited one 
example of a similar ackiioicledged claim, whicli was 
liable to as great abuses, and that is the right to take 



from neutral merchant sliips, thej^erso??^ of your ene- 
tnij — this includes the right of search for jmrsons as 
well as goods — and if the neutral cannot cover or 
withdraw from a belligerent the persons of the belli- 
gerent's enemy, because by so doings he deprives the 
belligerent of one of the rights of war, a fortiori, wq 
asked, can such neutral cover or protect the subject 
of the belligerent captor, who is more important to 
Mm, because when he gets an enemy, he is always 
ready to exchange him for a subject ? 

We then entered iuto a full display of tlie famous 
negotiation of Mouroe and Pliikuey, with the Fox 
ministry. We demonstrated, that while tliere was 
the most anxious solicitude in that ministry to retaiu 
the good will of the United States — to remove all 
just causes of complaint — while such offers were 
made to prevent the recurrence of them in future, as, 
m our opinion, would do it more effectually, than tlie 
flan propDsed hij Mr. Mvlison, because we are satis- 
fied that such abuses would soon creep in, as Avould 
oblige Great-Britain to recur to her former practice, 
even at the expense of peace — wliile indeed our own 
ministers were satisfied of the fairness, eligii)Jlity, and 
honourable character of these offers, lier statesmen, 
the most friendly to this country of any who have, for 
thirty years, swayed the councils of that nation, sol- 
emnly declared, that xo ministry, under amj emergen- 
cy, would ever dare to yield up the question of right. 

It is then reduced to this simple question — Shall 
we fight for a shadow when we can have tlie sub- 
stance ? Shall we fight to compel Great-Britain lo 
yield a claim older than our nation? Aright exer- 
cised by France and all other European nations ? A 
claim founded upon principles recognized and ad- 
judged by our own courts ? A claim wiiich if conce- 
ded will make our country swarm with English, 
Scotch and Irish sailors to the great injury and de- 
pression of our own ? A claim, which if yielded now, 
will certainly be resumed the moment the dreadful 
effects of its relinquishment shall be felt ? 



103 

We tlicn made some remarks ou the demand upon 
Governor Stroni; for the militia, and the intimation 
of the President that he had failed in his duty iu uot 
ordering them out. 

We proved, that Con2;res8 have no sort of control 
over the militia except in three specified cases. That 
neither of these cases had occurred — tliat the Govern- 
or was the constitutional and sole judge on this point, 
and with his usual consummate prudence he had con- 
sulted the Judgesj and with his accustomed firmness 
he had acted in pursuance of their advise and the 
dictates of his own judgment. 

The People ought to feel grateful to him for thus 
breasting the danger in defence of the constitutional 
privileges of the people. 

We concluded with some remarks which we deem 
of great importance as to t!ie organization of a stand- 
ing military force, under tlie name of volunteers, to 
reside in the midst of us^ to the utter ruin, if it suc- 
ceeds, of the militia. 

We have now completed this arduous duty.— ^ We 
cannot hope that the idle and the thoughtless will 
have derived much benefit from discussions wiiicli re- 
quire so much and so constant attention. We ap- 
peal, however, to the sober and reflecting part of so- 
ciety — and by their judgment we are willing to a. 
bide. 

We liave endeavoured soberly, fairly and honoura- 
bly to discuss the great question on which depends the 
peace and prosperity of the U. S. The question is a 
vital one. The vineyard is extensive and overgrown 
witli thorns, and the laborours are few. If a most ar- 
dent love of country, a strong desire to promote its 
permanent and best interests, though the means of 
doing it are ungrateful to those who undertake it, en- 
title a citizen to the good wishes of the publick, we 
shall not rest without hope. If ^^G fiiil in this, we 
shall have, what the world cannot take away, the tes- 
timony of a^good conscience. 



SOME GENERAL BRIEF REMARKS 

ON THE CAUSES AND OBJECTS OF THE PRESENT WAR— ON 
THE ERRONEOUS OPINIONS TO WHICH OUR PARTIAL SUC- 
CESSES AT SEA HAVE GIVEN BIRTH, AND ON THE DAN- 
GER, THAT OUR CITIZENS MAY BE DRAWN IN TO AID 
BY LOANS IN THE PROSECUTION OF A WAR, WHICH THEY 
DETEST. 

NO man, who has paid even a moderate degree of at- 
tention to the policy of Mr. Jefferson and Mr. Madison, for 
the last twenty years (I mean since the beginning of the war 
between Great-Britain and France) can doubt, that the present 
war between the United States and Great-Britain, is the con- 
summation which they have devoutly wished for. The author 
of the present essays has, for six years past, laboured inces- 
santly to satisfy the people, that war with Great-Britain was 
the ultimate and darling object of administration, and that it 
jnust and would take place. It has always appeared to him 
to be totally indifferent to administration, whether there was 
cause of war or not, or whether it could or could not be ad- 
justed by negotiation. The great labour on their part has 
seemed to be, to find plausible pretexts to keep the nation in 
a flame, to smother and conceal the injuries and insults of 
France, which would have counteracted their views against 
Great-Britain, and gradually to lead the naUon to the preci- 
pice of war. How far many of the real friends of peace, by 
joining in the clamour against Great-Britain, by denying the 
intentions of the administration to enter into war, and by stim- 
ulating the pride of the partizans of government, may have 
unintentionally promoted the secret views of Mr. Madison, is 
a question I have no disposition to discuss. 

I should not have even mentioned it at this time, if I had 
not been apprehensive that a game of the same sort is now 
attempted to be played off upon the friends of peace with re- 
spect to the navy. 

One of the greatest obstacles to' the general prevalence of 
the belief that our administration are absolutely devoted to the 
views and interests of France, and are bent upon the destruc- 
tion of Great-Britain, has been the want of visible motive. 
While some zealous men have charged even the heads of the 
French party with direct bribery and corruption, sober people, 
seeing no evidence of this fact, and feeling shocked at what 
they considered a calumny, have been disposed to go as far 
the other way)and to doubt the existence of any bias whatever 



105 

For ourselves, v/hile -vve perceive as plainly as we do the 
eourseof the planets in the zodiack, the absolute and entire 
ascendency of France in our counsels, we do not believe in 
the direct application of bribes to the higher minded men in 
the French interest. 

We are astonished that people should doubt that there are 
motives vastly stronger than those produced by corruption. 
Corrupt men are never so zealous as enthusiasts who are 
honest in their intentions. What contests were ever so bit- 
ter — what party ties so sti'ong, as those arising from religious 
i'cuds — from divisions about metaphysical poh.ts that neither 
party comprehends ? What partizans were ever so devoted, 
so desperate, so constant, as the adherents of the unfortunate 
house of Stuart, who, not having the means of subsistence 
themselves, could not be suspected of bribery ? 

Grant, therefore, only, that a party in favour of France was 
once organized, I care not by what means, it will always find 
materials for its support and encouragement : obstinacy, pride, 
the spirit of rivalry, will confirm, and irritate, and increase a 
party once formed. 

That such a party has existed, and still contiimes in most 
dreadful power and force, it would be almost as absurd to 
attempt to prove at this day, as it would be the height of 
impudence to deny. Who has forgotten the devotion to 
Genet, to Adet, to Fauchet ? the attempt to force Wasning- 
ton from his neutrality ? the clamour for war instead of nego- 
elation in 1794? Mr. Madison's famous resolutions intended 
to drive the nation into war ? the abuse of Mr. Jay and the 
President, for daring to preserve peace with Great-Britain ? 
the humiliating submission of Mr, Munroe to the French Di- 
rectory ? the opposition made to Mr. Adams, when he at- 
tempted to vindicate the honour of the nation, trampled under 
foot by France, who insulted our envoys and demanded a 
tribute from the nation ? These are things of elder time, and 
fit only for the historian. They prove not only a blind devo- 
tion to France in the present men in administration, but they 
satisfy us that it is a prejudice which has had time to strike 
its roots deep, and to send them out far and wide. Its nutri- 
ment has been at all times the honour and commercial pros- 
perity of our country. These it has absorbed — on these it 
has thrived, until it has almost exhaustetl the fertility of the 
soil. Prejudices like these, are not easily, we may add, are 
never rooted out. Who does not know that when lue ought 
to have been neutral, constant prayers were offered up, by 
these advocates of France here, for success to all her projects 
of universal dominion 1 Did France add a new victim to her 
14} 



106 

ambition ? they applauded. Did Great-Britain meet %vith 
disaster in her stand against French power ? they rejoiced as 
openly as the Gens d'armes des Tuileries. Did France ex- 
hibit a scene of internal anarchy — of horrors, at which the in- 
fernal legions of Milton would grow pale ? they saw in them 
only the struggles of suffering Freedom. Did these French 
anarchists yield to the arms of a mi/itartj des/iot, and groan 
under the most ruthless tyranny ? they stood ready, with Gov. 
Gerry and Mr. Livingston, to praise the incomparable hero and 
sage, and to offer their incense to the successor of Robespierre 
whom they had before saluted as a god. 

By encouraging such prrjudices Mr. Madison rose to dis- 
tinction. And if we should admit that a great mind like his, 
could easily shake them off, (which we doubt), still it is not in 
his, or any other man's power, to change at pleasure the feelings 
and opinions of a whole party. Attachment to France, an inter- 
est in French successes, and a hatred to Great-Britain, had be- 
come the religion of the party, and they were ready to go to 
martyrdom in defence of those opinions. 

Under such omens, and probably himself as deeply imbued 
with the same passions, Mr. Madison came into power. Has 
his conduct always corresponded Avith this view which we 
have given of his feelings ? It should be remembered that the 
French government, if it has not been in secret correspond- 
ence with these leaders, (which I doubt), has been, however, 
ficrfectly well informed of their feelings of dependence on 
France ; of the exact state of parties — their strength — their 
wishes — their designs — their movements. 

I beg any man who doubts this, to turn to any of Genet's or 
Adet's correspondence, but especially to Fauchet's intercept- 
ed letter. They know the strength and weakness of every con- 
siderable man in the United States. 

Let it be here distinctly understood, that I exclude from my 
argument any idea of corruption. 

With this knowledge of the state of parties, and of Mr. 
Madison's partialities and preferences, Bonaparte has put our 
President's patriotism and love for France to the most cruel 
trials. Would to God his patriotism had been any match for 
his love to France and hatred of Britain ! But Bonaparte was 
sure of his game. The ministers successively sent to France, 
he considered as fair samples of the administration which 
deputed them. Who has forgotten Mr. Livingston's incense 
to the Emperor, and his undiplomatick attack on Great-Bri- 
tain, with whom we were at peace, in his letter upon Drake's 
correspondence ? Not a minister from any of the tributary 
comts could vie with the envoy of the United States in the 
sujbmisbivencss of his reply. 



107 

Yet Mr. Livingston was the best of the three ; and would 
not have been fitted for the dark projects for which Mr. Bar- 
low was probably sent—to negotiate the conditions of alliance, 
and submission to the continental system. 

Now what has Bonaparte done, and to what have our ad- 
ministration submitted, without resistance, and even withoui 
complaint^ if we except a sentence or two in every phiiippick 
against Great-Britain, just calculated to deceive those only 
who nvish to be deceived ? 

We cannot give any detail ; the time and occasion will not 
allow of it. We shall only hint at what all the world knows; 
the lacts are both notorious and recent. 

In 1806, Bonaparte, having by the conquest of Prussia, got 
as he supposed, the command of the continent, determined 
to destroy a rival whom he could not reach by arms, by the 
destruction of her trade. So far as respected the continent, 
the plan was easily accomplished. But to make the experi- 
ment complete, the cooperation of the United States was in- 
dispensibly necessary. That cooperation has been obtained 
from the year 1807 to the present day, but never so complete- 
ly as he demanded, till we entered into the war. How this 
has been brought about, the world can never know. What 
•menaces, how much intrigue, solicitation, what promises of 
fiersonal sufijiort to administralion, if any, can never be known. 

We can only judge of publick facts; and from these Ave 
infer, that Bonaparte knew that he was so inseparably con- 
nected with the power, and so riveted in the affections of his 
party here, that he might put them to the severest trials with- 
out endangering their loyalty. The Berlin decree subjected 
every American vessel to capture going to or from a British 
port. Instead of resistance, not even a remonstrance was 
made to this act. It as been justly observed in the resolu- 
tions of New-York, that our government having assigned the 
British orders in council as one of the just causes oj ivar^ have 
admitted that the Berlin decree was also. How then can 
they justify themselves for submitting to it ? 

But Bonaparte found his Berlin decree ineffectual, and he 
accordingly negotiated with Armstrong an Embargo — or 
rather a monstrous thing, misnamed an Embargo, which was 
permanently to cut off our trade with Britain. That this was 
settled at Paris, and merely adojited very loyally by Congress^ 
is proved by the report first reaching us from Paris and HoU 
land. Many merchants in this town got knowledge of the 
proposition from Europe before it had been even whis" 
pered here. On the arrival of our messenger, Dr. Bullus, 
who reported the declaration of the Emperor, " that he 



108 

•would have no neutrals," the embargo was hastily adopted. 
1 he representatives of a great commercial nation, afforded 
the astonishing example of the sacrifice of a whole people to 
the caprice of an European tyrant ! The patience of that peo- 
ple was beyond ail example, and can only be accounted for by 
the astonishing influence which France has acquired over a 
certain portion of them. The dangers to which our com- 
merce was exposed, were the pretexts for that measure. 
And yet every man of sense knew that at that very moment 
our vessels could have been insured to Great-Britain for five 
per centum, and to India and back for eleven. In short, insu- 
rance was ViX. peace premiums I ! 

But even our patience at last had its bounds ; and after 
eighteen months proof of our disposition to aid France, gov- 
ernment was compelled to yield up the Emperors favourite 
measure, though to appease 'his rage a Non-Intercourse with 
Britain was substituted. Tyrants, accustomed to obedience, 
are not so easily appeased. The Emperor's rage broke out 
in every species of insult and contumely, as well as injury. 

In layiguage, by a letter dated February 16, 1810, he told 
us, " the Americans cannot hesitate as to the part which they 
are to take. They ought to tear to pieces the act of their In- 
dependence, or to take measures to prevent their commerce 
being taxed by England, which renders them more dependent 
tlian the colony of Jamaica, which has at least its assembly of 
representatives, a\id its privileges. Men without political 
views, without honour^ without energy, may allege, &c." 

Though some little symptoms, transient publick symptoms 
of sensibility were discovered on this occasion, yet no apology 
has ever been made, and the subject was suffered to slumber 
in oblivion, never again to be revived. 

But the rage of his Majesty did not evaporate in words. 
In defiance o{ the laivs of uU civilized society^ by a decree at 
Kambouillet, he confiscated all American vessels which had 
entered his ports at any time within six T[\on\\\?,ncxt preceding 
the decree. Of the amount of this plunder, we have no other 
evidence than the declaration of Gen. Armstrong, who knovv- 
ing the Emperor's character, said there was no hope of resto- 
ration, as the amount was twenty millions of dollars — a sum 
too large to restore even to the rightful owners ! I About this 
period too, the Emperor invented a nenu mode, (as Jefferson 
mildly characterized it), " of exercising might contrary to 
right." In violation of the settled principles of maritime law, 
his cruisers had orders to burn on the high seas all neutral 
vessels whom they should find trading with the enemy. This 
practice has continued down to the present year. The very 



109 

last French squadron which scoured the seas, Feretier's, was 
more ferocious than any former one. This was the last gen- 
tle hint to our delaying counsels. This was the immediate 
precursor of an alliance with France, and a compliance with 
the Emperor's views. Could it be believed if we had not seen 
it, that a President, who upon every occasion presents the 
whole picture of British wroni^s, includins^ those settled and 
comfiromised^ as well as others, should have neglected for 
seven years to mention in one smgle instance to Congress, 
these reiterated acts of piracy of France ? 

But the darkest, and most dreadfull part of the picture of 
partiality for France and contempt for our understandings is 
to be exhibited. 

In 1810, the United States having oftered to withdraw iheir 
restrictive measures irom either of tjie two nations which 
should cease to violate our neutral rights leaving them in 
force as to the other, the President declared solemnly that it 
was not his intention to give France this benefit until she not 
only should repeal her decrees but should restore the proper- 
ty '■^unjustly surprized in her ports" I use his own words. 

Nevertheless upon the Due de Cadore's promise, condi- 
tional promise, that the decrees Avould be repealed on certain 
terms on the first of November, 13 10, though accompanied 
■with a declaration that the " property unjustly surprized" 
would not be restored, the President, directly against his own 
assurance, declared the decrees actually repealed. 

Though proof heaped upon proof in the course of the suc- 
ceeding winter, that the decrees were not repealed — though 
their execution on the high seas was not even suspended, yet 
administration proceeded to enforce the act against Great 
Britain, and to swear to the good faith and honour of France. 
Nine months after the pretended repeal, Mr. Pvussc'.l begged 
the French minister to give the United States some proof of 
their repeal, and told him that he kept the John Adams wait- 
ing for some evidence to justify the liberal credit which our 
government had advanced to the Emperor. None could be 
obtained, except the release of two ships which did not come 
•iinthin the decrees. Jlgainst their repeal we had evidence the 
jnost abundant ; and we had most direct proofs that Bonaparte 
had resolved we sliould take more active measures against 
England, than a new pacifick Non Importation. 

Mr. Tureau told our government, in December, 1810, 
" These modifications (of the French trade) will not depend 
on the ciiancc of events, hut will be the result of other mea- 
sures^ firm, and puisucd with perseverance, which the two 
governments will contiv": to adopt to withdraw from the vexa- 



4 to 

tion of the common enemy a commerce necessary to France as 
well as the United States.'* 

Here we find the ivar firedicted and demanded. The Non 
Importation and pretended repeal of the decrees, were, it 
seems, the concerted measjires of the live governments : But 
the Emperor's favour would depend upon our continuing to 
adopt stronger measures against the common enemy. Nor 
did the Emperor leave us to doubt whether Tureau was au- 
thorized to hold such a language. The Due de Cadore, in the 
presence of his Majesty, on the third of December, declaredi 
that " as long as England shall persist in her orders in coun- 
cil your Majesty will persist in your decrees." And in March 
following, in an address to his Council of Commerce, the Em- 
peror in person said, " The decrees of Berlin and Milan are 
the fundamental laws of my empire. I will favour the Amer- 
ican commerce if tliey will conform to my decrees, otherwise 
1 will chase their vessels from my empire." 

This was four months after Madison declared the decrees 
repealed. But the Emperor did not confine his contradiction 
of Mr. Madison to words. On the fourth of July, 1811, (the 
day of the declaration of our Independence) the ship Julian was 
captured on the high seas, and on the tenth of September fol- 
lowing was condemned, " because she had been visited by 
British cruisers." 'i'he Emperor in person condemned in 
September, 1811, four vessels, which had been carried into 
Dantzick for offences which were created by the decrees, and 
by them alone. And our agent, Mr. Russell, in his letter to 
our Secretary of State, dated May 8th, 1811, six months aftev 
Madison's proclamation of the repeal of the French decrees, 
states, " that it may not be improper to remark that no Amer- 
ican vessel captured since November 1st. 1810, has yet been 
released." 

One would have thought the climax of our disgrace had 
been I'eached — that the measure of humiliation was full — but 
wc were reserved for still further disgraces. In May, 1812, 
the Emperor published a decree bearing date April 28th, 
181 1, in which, reciting our obedience and loyalty in exclud- 
ing British goods and admitting his, he declares on that ac- 
count his decrees repealed so far as regards us. Thus giving 
in the face of the whole world the lie direct — the lie without 
ajiology — the lie without circumlocution to all t!ie declarations 
of our government, as to the repeal of the French decrees in 
November, 1810 — cutting up also by the roots the foundation 
of all our statutes against Great Britain, the last of which was in 
March preceding the repeal of the French decrees, and which 
were founded on her refusal to believe the decrees repealed 



Ill 

ih November. The main reason for which we went to war 
with Great Britain was, that she would not repeal her orders 
in three months after France repealed her decrees, which she 
was bound to believe took place in November, 1810. Now 
Bonaparte justifies her incredulity, and accuses Mr. Madison 
of rashness and folly. 

The manner of doing this last act has something extreme- 
ly wicked and suspicious on the face of it That Bonaparte, 

when so often urged and solicited to furnish the evidence of 
the repeal of the decrees, should have kept back, for 1 2 months, 
a decree affecting only tis, and necessary to the vindication of 
his constant friends in America, is extraordinary. It matters 
not whether it existed at its date, or was antedated. In either 
case it was kept back till he was satisfied that we had come 
to the striking fioint. It was kept back until it was impossible 
it should produce an operation in England, and that operation be 
known here before the war. It was well known to France and 
America, that the word of Great Britain had been pledged to 
repeal her Orders in Council as soon as France should repeal 
her decrees. It is a word never lightly given, and never for- 
feited. Can any man have charity to believe that this almost 
simultaneous repeal of the decrees — of the Orders in Coun- 
cil, and of the declaration of war, was the effect of accident ? 
In short that it was not the " result," as Tureau says, " of oth- 
er measures which the two Governments have continued to 
take against the common enemy ;" 

Let any doubting man look at the Emperor's publick dec- 
laration inMarch last, that " his decrees should be the funda- 
mental laws of his Empire, until the principles of the treaty 
of Utretcht, shall be recognized by Great Britain." 

Let him look at the refusal of our Government, to make e- 
ven an Armistice^ after the total repeal of the Orders in Coun- 
cil and all other blockades. 

Then let him say whether this war is not a fulfilment of the 
reiterated demands of France, to enter into the coalition. 

Let him consider how admirably it was timed for the inter- 
ests of France — how it cooperates with her views upon Rus- 
sia and Spain, by making a serious diversion of the British 
forces at this most critical junciure, which the world has seen 
for 20 years, and then let him soberly ask himself, whether 
the war is carried on for French or American interests ? 



It is not one of the least evils of this unnatural and unjust 
war, that the noblest virtues of the citizen may be converted 
into the means of favouring the views of the v\dministration, 
and of prolonging the duration of the war. It is impossible 



113 

for a generous mind not to view with the highest feelings of 
approbation, the gallant efforts of our naval officers and sea- 
men. That unconquerable spirit, that self devotion, that skill 
and coolness which have rendered the British marine so su- 
periour to that of all other natiors, have been displayed in the 
highest degree by our infant NAVY. 

But a reflecting man, who is sincerely desirous of seeing 
peace restored to our Country, cannot but perceive that an 
artful administration will convert this natural and generous en- 
thusiasm into the means of promoting" their own views. Al- 
ready we are told by Mr. Madison, with a triumphant air, 
that our naval victories " will dispose Great Britain to peace, 
and that o\xv pros^ieroiis career may be accelerated^ but cannot 
be prevented hy the assaults made upon it." See his last 
message covering Decatur's letter. 

It is because we believe this proposition absolutely false — 
that the reverse of it is true, to wit, that our naval successes 
will procrastinate the period of peace, and render all attempts 
at negotiation, while this state of things continues, abortive. 
And because we fear, that some men may be led to believe 
that Great Britain can be humbled on the ocean, of which 
there is as little prospect as there was when the war was de- 
clared, that we deem it a solemn duty to make some remarks 
upon the subject. 

We think it proper to premise that we have never doubted, 
that our Country was capable of producing excellent officers 
and sailors. 

The same causes which have rendered the British marine 
hitherto so superiour, operate as powerfully in our favour. — 
We have the same hardy courage — the same enterprise — the 
same skill. 

We have been of opinion that a marine force was our nat- 
ural defence, and ought to have been fostered and encourag- 
ed. We have never believed that even British ships, conduct- 
ed by their ablest officers, would be an over-match for ours, 
in vessels of equal size, and especially where we should have a 
decided superiority of force. 

But though such arc our opinions, we think we are in some 
danger of falling into two errors on that subject, one of which 
is disreputable to us as a brave and magnanimous nation, and 
the other may be of fatal consequence. 

The first is, a boastful, sanguine and overbearing temper. 
The officers of our Navy have too much of the true spirit of 
brave men to fall into this error. They know too well the char- 
acter of their adversaries to undervalue either their bravery or 
their skill. You will never hear any of the most experienced 
among them utter such idle boasts, as that " man for man 



113 

and gun for gun," we shall always beat the British. They 
know that in two out of three of the contests which have taken 
place, the superiority of force on our side was such that while 
it would have been disgraceful for our officers to have beea 
beaten, no degree of reproach could attach to the foe wliora 
ihey subdued for yielding to the most powerful single decked 
ships in the world. 

We feel a perfect confidence, that such men as Decalur, 
Hull, and Jones will agree with us in every proposition we 
shall advance. 

The opinions and sentiments to which we allude, and which, 
we think reprehensible, are those of hasty men, who draw in- 
ferences from suigle examples which they certainly do not 
warrant. 

You hear them every day declaring that one of our large 
frigates would capture a British 74 — that we have wrested the 
Trident of Neptune from Great Britain — that we shall always 
be superior to them in single ships. 

To hear such persons discourse, one would imagine that 
-they were astonished to find we could beat even an inferior 
British ship— that they had believed us incapable of meeting 
the Europeans in equal conflict, and that they were so trans^ 
ported and surprised by the unexpected success, that they 
now believed the age of miracles had returned, and that the 
British banner was no longer to float upon the ocean. 

Enthusiasm has its uses, but it may produce its evils. Lit- 
tle as they may believe it, the chances of war may turn, and 
the mortification and chagrin is always in proportion to the 
previous exultation. We had a recent and terrible example 
in the case of Gen. SMYTHE. The man who presented him- 
self as a conqueror, with such a ridiculous gasconade, three 
weeks since, is now exhibiting his excuses to an unauthoriz- 
ed association on the frontiers of New York. His soldiers are 
breaking their muskets in pure mortification, and his officers 
their sAvords. 

If indeed success should always follow our Navy, still one 
evil would result from this boasting spirit, it would diminish 
the glory of victory. 

We trust, however, and believe that this extravagant and 
bombastick spirit is not a very general one. That while we 
cherish and honour and reward the gallantry of our Navy, we 
shall and do imitate their modesty, and their justice towards 
the vanquished. 

The foible wliich we have first been considerijig, is only a 
small blemish, and would not be productive of any serious 
c&i» sequences. 

If 



114 

The other opinion advanced by Mr. Madison is a serious 
one, and deserves a thorough consideration. 

Is it true " that the capture of five or even ten British frig- 
ates will dispose Great Britain to fieace, and does this sort of 
Gontest " accelerate our prosperity," as Mr. Madison says ? 

If these successes will dispose her to peace, it must be on 
the ground upon which Mr. Madison seems to have rested 
his hopes, and that is that it will satisfy her that we are a more 
formidable nation on the ocean than she thought us, and that 
if the war is continued we can wrest from her the Irident of 
Neptune, 

Now let us consider this point — Great-Britain has a terri- 
tory about as big as the New-England states. She never 
would have attained to a primary rank among the European 
nations, if she had not cultivated and encouraged a navy. Her 
insular situation renders it necessary that she should maintain, 
one. She owes her liberties to that, and that alone — These 
propositions are as obvious to her as they are to us. 

Can it be believed, that she will surrender her maritime 
superiority ? Will she make peace, while her arms are tar- 
nished with the stains which we have imprinted upon them ? 
Will she not say, " my navy is my only defence, it must not 
only be superior, but its reputation must be unimpaired ?" 
" However disposed I might have been to make peace with 
America, I cannot do it til) this disgrace is wiped off." 

Will any man doubt her power to do this ? Is there any 
one so prejudiced as to believe, that she cannot rouse her citi- 
zens to fight with as much gallantry and skill as ours ? 

We are the same people — have the same general features 
of character, and though we have not degenerated, I see no 
reason to presume that we have improved on the original 
stock. 

We have seven frigates, and four or five smaller ships — 
She has 200 ships of the line, 250 frigates, and three or four 
iiundred smaller vessels of war. 

It is in her power to send a squadron of line of battle ships, 
to destroy our marine, without a contest. 

If Bonaparte, starting with the old marine of France, of 
Spain, and Holland, comprizing nearly 200 ships of the line, 
and devoting yearly to his navy alone 150 millions of livres, 
GO millions of dollars, (amounting to the whole of our war 
Expenses, for both army, navy, and civil list) has been unable, 
during twelve years, to make the smallest head against the 
British navy, can we expect to do it with our little squadron, 
and witiiout any revenue but loans ? 

Jt is said, however, that we are a different race of men from' 



ii5 

the French and Dutch. We can beat Great-Britain, though 
they could not. Both France and Holland have obtained as 
many and more signal victories, in single ships, over Great- 
Britain, than we have done. Nay, they have been more formid- 
able rivals to her than we could possibly become in many 
years. And yet the consciousness of the absolute necessity of 
her navy to her existence, has made Great-Britain rise su- 
perior to all her enemies or rivals. 

It is impossible, from the constitution of human nature, that 
you can ever rouse a nation to so great exertions, for a ques- 
tion on which its existence does not depend, as for one upon 
which it does. Hence nations will not fight as strenuously in 
foreign wars, in wars of conquest, as in wars of self-defence, 
and when their fire-sides are invaded. 

Now, though our marine is important to us, it is by no 
means so vital an interest, as it is to Britain. To us it guards 
important rights, and produces a security to a trade necessary 
to our opulence— with her, it is the bulwark which defends 
her temples and her fire-sides. 

Our farmers, though they would maintain a respectable 
navy, would never be taxed to support 150 ships of the line, 
and 200 frigates, which, at the rate of the expense of our pre- 
sent navy, would cost, for their first equipment, 150 millions 
of dollars, and, for their annual support, 50 millions of dollars 
per annum, at least. 

I cannot perceive, then, that the capture of twenty British 
frigates, nor the building of ten 74's, would the more dispose 
Great-Britain to peace ; nor does any sensible man believe it. 
On the contrary, it will render peace im/iossidle, until Great- 
Britain shall have put at rest the question of naval superiority, 
and have vindicated the injured honour of her flag, which every 
coal-heaver in the nation will feel to be a wound in his own 
honour — Much less can I perceive, with Mr. Madison, how 
the capture of a few British frigates, followed up, as it will 
be, with the blockade of our ports, and the destruction of our 
navy, accelerates our prospei-ity. 

ON THE SUBJECT OF LOANS IN UNJUST WARS. 

In just and necessary wars, it is the duty of all good citizens 
to contribute according to their means. Whether their per-, 
sonal services in the field — their councils in the cabinet— or 
their money be required in the treasury, they ought to render 
them with alacrity. If, however, the war be such an one as, 
in their consciences, they cannot approve, it is equally their 
duty to withhold every thing which the government cannot 
by law command. 



116 

This duty is the more imperious, if the war is of such «. 
character as tends to destroy the commerce, and injure the 
rights and interests of that part of the country to which such 
citizens belong. 

It is evident, that one of the most embarrassing impedi- 
ments, which our administration encounters, is tlie difficulty 
of finding resources to carry on the war. 

Mr. Gallatin, for three years past, has calculated on loans 
as the means of supporting the expenses of war, and he has 
attempted to deceive the money holders, by stating, that in 
the peace which must necessarily succeed to all wars, the 
revenue will always be sufficient to pay the interest of the 
debt contracted during war. 

The govurnment dare not resort to direct taxes. The war 
has alif.natcd already all the northern states. Taxes would 
complete what is begun, and administration would be left 
viiitout support. 

Under tJiis view of our affairs, the men who are opposed to 
the wjir, and at the same time loan their money necessary, 
absolutely necessary, to its continuance, are as much respon- 
sible for its consequences, as any of those who voted for it. 

. We know how hard a struggle it is for those who have been 
accusLonied to regular increase of rapital, to suffer it to lie 
Ixi an' Unproductive state. It is not, that, by letting it lie idle, 
they make any real sacrifices, in any degree, in proportion to 
tvnat otlier citizens suffer ; but it is hard to control a power- 
ful passion. 

\Vg are aware, that patriotick motives are cold and inope- 
rsuve against the seducing and tyrannical influence flf a love 
oi increase and gain ; but we would say a word or two aS 
to their interest. 

Does any one recollect in history, any war to be compared 
to that which now deluges Europe with blood ? Will any 
statesman undertake to predict the period of its termination ? 
Are there any rational data, by which we can suppose that 
ou? war with Britain will have a speedier termination ? 

The annual expense of the war, for the next year, is esti- 
mated at 32 millions of dollars. The deficit, to be supplied 
by loans, will be 20 millions. When the army is full, the an- 
nual expense cannot be less than 50 millions, and the revenue 
will not exceed five millions. How long will it be at this 
rate, before the monied capital will be exhausted ? Will the 
interest of the debt be paid after the loans cease ? Or will the 
southern people throw away the fiealf after they have squeeze 
ed the orange ? Will they tax themselves, to pay a debt of 
honour to those " wretches of the north," tis they have lateJy 



117 

called us ? I trust our capitalists have too much good sens© 
and publick virtue, to lend their money to support such a 
cause — to support a cause calculated to effect their ruin— If 
they do, they will fall unpitied. 

It should be remembered, that the southern statesmen op- 
posed the funding of the debt of the revolution, and that in the 
late loan of thirteen millions, the southern states, which voted 
for the war, have subscribed but one million, and most of 
them not a dollar. 

There is no country on the face of the globe, where the 
monied interest has so little political influence as in ours, or 
where it is so much the object of jealousy and hatred. The 
soutliern states despise and detest it, because they have no 
participation in it, and because it offends the aristocratick 
pride and pretensions of the planters and slave-holders. 

In New-England, our farmers have something of the same 
feeling. Who have hitherto supported the banking and mon- 
ied interests of this country, avid the credit of the publick 
funds ? Men of talents and political information and influence, 
who were in no degree benefitted personally by the protection 
given to capital. To Hamilton and Ames, in an especial 
manner, were the capitalists indebted for the security and 

protection thev iiave recpived 

But cap the capitalists calculate upon the support of such 
men, in future, for the loans which they may now make, to 
enable administration to carry on a war ruinous to the com- 
mercial states ? 

I should suppose they would as soon vote pensions to Sea- 
ver, and Porter, and Mr. Madison, the authors of the war, as 
they would funds to pay the interest of loans, expressly open- 
ed to enable the government to carry on a war, destructive of 
the interests of the northern states, and blasting to the hopes 
of all the young men of talents in these commercial states. 

There is one other important idea which I Avish to suggest 
on this subject. 

Madison and Gallatin have too much wit for our monied 
men. They probably reasoned thus — " Let us plunge into 
this war. In will destroy external commerce ; it will destroy 
property vested in wharves and stores, and other conveniencies 
necessary to foreign trade. The banks will diminish their 
discounts. The rate of interest will fall. The anxious spirit 
of monied men will be sharpened in proportion to their losses. 
They will be coy at first, and make a bluster of their princi- 
ples, but they will finally yield. If they make the most solemn 
resolutions not to subscribe to our loans, still they will buy 
into the stocks, and that is precisely the same thing to us. 



118 

No man can stand the temptation of six per cent, when he 
cannot get more than five in other employments. It is 
beyond human nature to keep capital wholly unemployed 
during a war without prospect of end. To be sure, the debt 
"will amount during the new term of presidency, to two hun- 
dred millions, and to be sure a peace revenue will never de- 
fray the civil list and the interest of this debt ; but after we 
have reduced these northern purse-proud gentry to the con- 
dition in which they were in 1787, we shall leave it to the 
•wisdom of Mr. Troup and Bibb, and the other gentlemen of 
the south, whether it is expedient to manage these capitalists 
any longer, after we have attained all our objects of them. 
Let us wipe off the old score, and let these northern hives be- 
gin to gather their honey anew." 

It is curious, but not more curious than true, that the very 
measures which impoverish, and perhaps were intended to im- 
poverish, our merchants, our banks and our insurance offices, 
also render our remaining cafiital unproductive ; and by those 
very means favour the views and facilitate the projects and 
loans of Administration. 

The same effect is calculated upon to recruit our armies. 
Mr, Madison says our farmers are too happy and too rich to 
enlist. The war, he thinks no doubt, will make them poorer ; 
and they will soon be glad to sell themselves cheap to the 
lashes of the Serjeants, and to subject themselves to the dis- 
eases and horrors of the camp. 

Thus publick misfortunes and private distress are the nu- 
triments of the war, and the means upon which administration 
may coolly and wisely calculate to forward and accomplish 
their views. 

There is one other thought, which men are afraid to exam- 
ine, because it is too alarming. I mean the possibility of a 
settled design to subdue the refractory spirit of the Northern 
States by the sword. If we had not the direct threats of Mr. 
D. R. Williams and others, if we did not know, that it is the 
private, every days conversation of these warm bloods of the 
south, that they will teach Governor Strong and the governors 
of the other Yankee States their duty, and the necessity of 
obedience, surely the creation of a gens d'armes, a volun- 
teer force in full pay, and to be permitted to stay at home, 
recommended by Mr. Madison, ought to excite the attention 
and jealousy, if it does not the fears, of all prudent men. I 
have no doubt that designs are seriously formed by some 
southern people, to subdue by force, the majorities of th^ 
nqith, who are opposed to them. Is this the time to. lend 



119 

them our money ? Would it not be as prudent and judicious 
to keep it for ourselves ? ^ » 

We have said, the revenue will be insufficient to pay the 
interest of the debt, if the war lasts, which it probably will 
four years more. 

Let us make peace how and when we will, we are never 
again to be a neutral state between two great belligerents. 
If we make peace with Britain, we shall be at war with 
France and the continent. If there is a general peace, we 
shall be excluded from the profitable trade of all the world, 
for each nation will restore its system of monopoly. 

Besides, the habits of smuggling have taken such deep root' 
that they can never be eradicated. The encouragement given 
to manufactures by the war, will also lessen our importations. 
We shall never again in twenty years see a revenue of twelvei 
•millions of dollars. The peace establishment of army, navy, 
and civil list, will consume eight millions at least. How is, 
the interest of two hundred millions of new debt to be paid? 
As long as you lend, they will pay you the interest, but not a' 
moment longer, 



LbML '06 



I 



